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INTRODUCTION
Despite having little knowledge about the internal structure and
investment methods of hedge funds,' Americans have invested in
these elusive funds at exponentially increasing rates in recent years.2
I See, e.g., Comment, Paul R. Davis, Attorney, Boston, Mass., on Proposed Rule: Regis-
tration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 2266, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,172 (Nov. 7, 2004) [hereinafter Davis Comment], http:/
/www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/prdavis9213.htm ("[T]he real reason for this [hys-
teria associated with hedge funds] is that they operate in cloaked environments, in stealth
mode, unlike mutual funds or other comparable investment vehicles."); PRESIDENT'S WORK-
ING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPI-
TAL MANAGEMENT 1 (1999) ("The term 'hedge fund' is commonly used to describe a variety
of different types of investment vehicles that share some similar characteristics."); Marcia
L. MacHarg, Waking up to Hedge Funds: Is US. Regulation Really Taking a New Direction?, in
HEDGE FUNDS: RISKS AND REGULATION 55, 57 (Theodor Baums & Andreas Cahn eds., 2004)
("The term 'hedge fund' is frequently used in the United States to identify a broad range
of private investment vehicles that actively trade a variety of securities and commodities
through a multitude of investment strategies, with an almost unbounded range of risk and
return objectives."); HedgeFunds and the SEC: StillFree, ECONOMIST, July 1, 2006, at 68 (quot-
ing Senator Orrin Hatch as calling hedge funds the "Wild West" of America's financial
system); Steven Rattner, Don't Fence in Hedge Funds, Bus. WK.,Jan. 16, 2006, at 104 ("[T]he
secret to understanding hedge funds is to first accept the irrelevance of the term 'hedge
fund.'").
2 No concrete figures exist as to the extent of U.S. investment in hedge funds. See,
e.g., Recent Developments in Hedge Funds, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and
Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 8 (2003) (statement of William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_senate_hearings&docid=f:92703.wais.pdf (estimating that
there are 5,700 hedge funds in the United States that manage approximately $600 billion
in total assets); PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 1, at I (estimating
that as of mid-1998, there were 2,500 to 3,500 hedge funds that managed "between $200
billion and $300 billion in capital, with approximately $800 billion to $1 trillion in total
assets"); Brett Duval Fromson, Hedge Funds Today: Fortunes Favor the Brave, WALL ST. J., Nov.
22, 2005, at A14 (estimating that there are 8,000 hedge funds that manage approximately
$1 trillion in total assets); Jayesh Punater, Registration Pro and Con, SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS,
Oct. 24, 2005, at 4 ("[H]edge funds . . . have been growing at an exponential rate, with
assets under management now exceeding $1 trillion. The SEC knew hedge funds were
growing, but it had no reliable data indicating just how many funds there were and exactly
how much money they were managing."); Andy Serwer, Carlo's Way: This Zany Hedge Fund
Manager Preaches Peace-and Wages War, FORTUNE, Nov. 14, 2005, at 73 ("[T]here are more
hedge funds than Taco Bells in the U.S." (quoting hedge fund managerJ. Carlo Cannell));
Paul F. Roye, Dir. of Inv. Mgmt., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Keynote Address at the Tenth
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Not only does U.S. law fail to define "hedge fund,"3 it also creates
loopholes such that most hedge funds and their advisers do not need
to register with a regulatory body such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). 4 While hedge funds may occasionally fall under
the regulatory authority of other agencies,5 hedge fund advisers and
administrators strive to avoid disclosure and additional regulation.
Avoiding disclosure and regulation reduces costs for investors and im-
proves funds' returns.6
Annual Advanced ALI-ABA Course of Study: Investment Management Regulation (Oct. 28,
2004) [hereinafter Roye Speech], http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch102804pfr.htm
("While no one knows for sure, it is estimated that in the last five years, hedge funds have
grown by 260[%], with assets of approximately $870 billion in approximately 7,000 funds.
Some predict that hedge fund assets will soon reach one trillion dollars."). Perhaps the
recent fall of Amaranth Advisors LLC-the Connecticut-based hedge fund that managed
$9.2 billion before its "mammoth trading mistakes" caused the fund to lose approximately
$6 billion of its assets during 2006, forcing it to sell off its assets and ultimately close-will
encourage closer examination of the industry. Ron Orol, A Gathering Storm?, DAILY DEAL,
Oct. 2, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 16942481; see also Allan Sloan, One Hedge Fund's Wilt-
ing Fortunes, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 2, 2006, at 15 ("We at Newsweek don't print obituaries before
our subject has been officially declared dead.... But [Amaranth is] so deep in the hole
that I can't imagine it surviving.").
3 See, e.g., Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("'Hedge funds'
are notoriously difficult to define. The term appears nowhere in the federal securities
laws, and even industry participants do not agree upon a single definition."); Regulation of
Hedge Funds: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong.
(2006) (statement of Randal K. Quarles, Under Secretary for Domestic Finance, Depart-
ment of the Treasury) [hereinafter Quarles Statement], available at http://banking.senate
.gov/_files/ACFB976.pdf ("Despite the fact that hedge funds are today the subject of every-
day discussion in the financial press and among policymakers, there is no universally ac-
cepted definition of a hedge fund."); PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra
note 1, at I ("The term 'hedge fund' .... is not statutorily defined ...."); Troy A. Paredes,
On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission,
2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 975, 976 ("In large part, hedge funds are defined by the extent to
which the [SEC] . . .does not regulate them.").
4 See Franklin R. Edwards, The Regulation of Hedge Funds: Financial Stability and Investor
Protection, in HEDGE FUNDS: RiSKS AND REGULATION, supra note 1, at 30, 35 ("[H]edge funds
exist because they fill a gap created by the many laws and regulations that restrict the activi-
ties of other investment vehicles." (emphasis added)). This Note will discuss registration of
hedge fund advisers only with respect to U.S. federal law. Generally, states do not impose
registration requirements on investment advisers. See, e.g., DOUGLAS L. HAMmMER ET AL.,
U.S. REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS § 2.2(5), at 19-20 (2005).
5 See infra Part III.
6 See infra notes 35, 210 and accompanying text.
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The SEC 7 and other U.S. regulatory bodies8 have noted the
increased investment interest in hedge funds. As a result, the SEC
considered increasing its regulatory presence in the hedge fund
arena. Historically, hedge fund advisers have not been subject to the
strict requirements of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.9 This
changed in 2004, when the SEC expanded its regulatory reach by cre-
ating a mandatory registration provision for many hedge fund advis-
ers, 10 which would subject hedge fund advisers to the registration
requirements of the Investment Advisers Act. The new rule mandated
registration with the SEC by February 1, 2006.11 In enacting these
provisions, the SEC emphasized the need to collect data to fill in in-
formational gaps for U.S. investors interested in investing in hedge
funds, to deter and detect fraud by hedge fund advisers, 12 to prevent
unfit advisers from managing hedge funds, to adopt measures to pro-
tect hedge fund investors, and to limit the marketing of hedge funds
to unsuitable investors.1 3 Even though nearly one thousand hedge
funds registered with the SEC,14 more than one hundred subse-
7 See Div. OF INV. MGMT., SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, STAFF REPORT TO THE U.S. SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS 9-10 (2003).
Professor Troy Paredes has suggested that one of the SEC's motivations for the hedge fund
registration requirement was that the SEC "did not want to get caught flat-footed and em-
barrassed again, as it had been by Enron, WorldCom, the mutual fund abuses, and securi-
ties analyst conflicts of interest." Paredes, supra note 3, at 975-76. Professor Paredes
attributes the SEC's shift toward an "aggressive," "better to be safe than sorry" attitude to
the precautionary principle of behavior. Id. at 1007. For a full description of the precau-
tionary principle, see Julian Morris, Defining the Precautionary Principle, in RETHINKING RISK
AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 1 (Julian Morris ed., 2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible
and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 841, 848-55 (2006).
8 See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., AGREEMENT AMONG PWG AND
U.S. AGENCY PRINCIPALS ON PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES REGARDING PRIVATE PooLs oF CAPI-
TAL (2007), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/principles.pdf
(calling for unified regulatory efforts among U.S. agencies).
9 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2000); see Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain
Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec.
10, 2004); Thomas Lee Hazen, Investment Advisers Act of 1940: Who Is SubJect to the Advisers
Act?, in LAw OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 21.2 (5th ed. 2005); MacHarg, supra note 1, at 88
("[T]he United States is one of the few countries that does not require hedge fund spon-
sors to register.").
10 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.203(b) (3)-1 to -2 (2006). Consumers can easily access the re-
gistration database. See Investment Adviser Public Disclosure, http://www.adviserinfo.sec
.gov (last visited Mar. 10, 2007).
11 See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed.
Reg. at 72,054.
12 This is a general goal of the SEC. See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for
Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1073, 1085 (2005).
13 See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed.
Reg. at 72,054.
14 See, e.g., Kara Scannell, Making Hedge Funds Less Secret, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2006, at
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quently deregistered 15 following the District of Columbia Circuit's de-
cision in Goldstein v. SEC,16 which invalidated the registration
requirement. 17
Although the registration requirement sought to increase the
SEC's regulatory strength over hedge fund advisers as a whole, it did
little to regulate offshore hedge funds and their advisers. Considering
the SEC's reasons for enacting the amendments to the registration
requirements of the Investment Advisers Act,18 this lack of oversight
for offshore hedge funds contravenes the purposes of the amend-
ments. By regulating onshore hedge funds with higher scrutiny than
offshore funds, the SEC encouraged onshore advisers to move their
funds offshore1 9 or to create parallel offshore fund structures and sub-
sequently move invested capital to the offshore funds. Once advisers
move funds offshore, the SEC will be unable to achieve its goals of
detecting and deterring fraud and generally protecting hedge fund
investors.
Therefore, regulation of offshore hedge funds is important to the
safety and integrity of U.S. markets. By registering only onshore fund
advisers, the SEC not only encouraged hedge fund advisers to move
offshore, but it also gave small investors a false sense of security when
investing in hedge funds, both onshore and offshore. New commer-
cial products, which are available to all investors, evaluate hedge fund
returns and could augment this misleading sense of security.20
15 See, e.g., Hedge Fund Advisers Flee SEC Register, TIMES (U.K), Sept. 28, 2006, at 47;
Hedge Funds Reject SEC Oversight After Court Annuls Disclosure Requirement, BLOOMBERG.COM
WORLDWIDE NEWS, Sept. 22, 2006, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087
&sid=aBelQxtgfAk&refer=Worldwidenews. But see, e.g., Hedge Funds and the SEC: Still Free,
supra note 1 ("Many hedge funds are likely to stay registered, to reassure institutional
investors.").
16 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
17 See id. at 883-84.
18 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
19 But see Alex R. McClean, Note, The Extraterritorial Implications of the SEC's New Rule
Change to Regulate Hedge Funds, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 105, 107 (2006) ("Hedge
funds... are not moving anywhere[,] .. .because market conditions, foreign regulators,
and provisions of the new rule make moving offshore impractical."). However, in making
this claim, McClean initially ignores the fact that even prior to registration, many U.S.
hedge funds had already created parallel funds offshore. Later in his Note, McClean con-
tradicts his earlier assumptions about the willingness of hedge fund managers to go off-
shore. See id. at 132 ("Hedge funds can change domiciles quickly and cheaply since they
do not own any physical assets. The only asset that a hedge fund would have to transport
would be its human capital."). For a discussion of some of the motivations for hedge fund
managers to go offshore, see Mara Der Hovanesian, For Hedge Funds, Some Sweet Deals, Bus.
WK., May 8, 2006, at 11.
20 See, e.g., Anne Tergesen, Sizing up a Hedge, Bus. WK., Nov. 28, 2005, at 128 ("With
hedge funds booming-and investors worried about getting burned-mutual fund tracker
Morningstar and bond rater Moody's Investors Service plan to launch hedge fund research
tools [in 2006] and make them available to individual investors."). The Web site www
.hedgebay.com also lists more than 600 offshore hedge funds and allows the funds to take
2007]
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This Note contends that the SEC's amended registration require-
ments were insufficient to address potential problems with offshore
hedge funds. It also suggests that in enacting the amendments, the
SEC did not address its own concerns raised during internal discus-
sion of the amendments. In particular, the amendments did not ad-
dress the loopholes that allow offshore fund advisers to operate largely
unregulated. Part I provides background by explaining how offshore
hedge funds have historically operated and by contrasting the SEC's
treatment of onshore hedge funds with its treatment of offshore
hedge funds. It also clarifies the changes that the amendments made
to the existing hedge fund regulation regime and summarizes criti-
cisms of the rule and its effects. Part II elaborates on the concerns
that the SEC staff, financial institution insiders, and legal insiders
raised during the rule-making process and shows how the SEC system-
atically rejected measures that would have empowered it to regulate
offshore hedge fund advisers. Part II also discusses how the registra-
tion requirement would allow fraud to flourish in the offshore market,
thus increasing the risk to U.S. investors and markets. Part III de-
scribes how other U.S. regulatory bodies, including the Internal Reve-
nue Service (IRS), the U.S. Department of Labor as mandated by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), and the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), 21 have regulated off-
shore investments and advisers. Part IV suggests possible fixes for the
SEC's registration regulation.
offers and bids from potential investors. See Online Matchmaking: Trading Hedge Funds,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 6, 2005, at 59.
21 As a preliminary disclosure, the author interned at the CFTC's Division of Enforce-
ment in the Eastern Region. The views expressed here are hers alone and do not reflect
the views of the CFTC.
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I
BACKGROUND AND DESCRIPTION OF OFFSHORE HEDGE
FUND REGULATION
A. Structure of Offshore Hedge Funds and Previous SEC
Regulation
Offshore hedge funds with ties to the United States are usually
established as corporations 22 in the Cayman Islands, 23 the British
Virgin Islands, 24 or Bermuda.2 5 Traditionally, offshore hedge funds
have attracted investment from U.S. tax-exempt entities, including
foundations, endowments, 26  charitable trusts, and pension
22 See, e.g., Div. OF INV. MGMT., supra note 7, at 9. Whereas offshore hedge funds are
typically set up as corporations, onshore funds are normally set up as limited partnerships.
See id. at 10. For a pictorial depiction of hedge fund structures for both onshore and
offshore hedge funds, see HAMMER ET AL., supra note 4, §§ 4.3-4.4. These offshore hedge
funds organized under non-U.S. law may only make a private offering to U.S. investors "if
after the private offering the foreign fund's securities are held by no more than 100 benefi-
cial owners resident in the United States, or if all of the beneficial owners resident in the
United States are 'qualified purchasers' . . . ." PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS.,
supra note 1, at app. B n.3.
23 See, e.g., SIMONE BoRLA & DENIS MASETrI, HEDGE FUNDS: A RESOURCE FOR INVESTORS
75 (2003); COMPARATIVE JURISDICTION GUIDE: WHERE TO SET UP AND, PERHAPS, MANAGE A
HEDGE FUND? 19-20 (Carol Bonnett & Sarah Barham eds., 2005); GORDON DE BROUWER,
HEDGE FUNDS IN EMERGING MARKETS 12 (2001); Alan L. Kennard, The Hedge Fund Versus the
Mutual Fund, 57 TAX LAW. 133, 158 (2003);James Eedes, Cayman Islands: Offshore, on Target,
BANKER, July 1, 2006, at 106 (stating that the Cayman Islands' regulator had more than
1700 hedge fund registrations in 2005 and that the regulator estimates that it currently
regulates 80% of hedge funds worldwide); Hedging and Betting, INT'L MONEY MARKETING,
Sept. 9, 2004, at 25; Neal Lomax, Hedge Funds, MONDAQ, June 12, 2006, available at 2006
WLNR 10049660 (stating that of the approximately 8,000 active funds that will be regis-
tered in the Cayman Islands by the end of 2006, approximately 95% will be hedge funds).
24 See, e.g., BORLA & MASETri, supra note 23, at 75; COMPARATIVE JURISDICTION GUIDE:
WHERE TO SET UP AND, PERHAPS, MANAGE A HEDGE FUND?, supra note 23, at 11-12; DE
BROUWER, supra note 23, at 12; Kennard, supra note 23, at 158; Hedging and Betting, supra
note 23. But see, e.g., Jeremy Grant & Richard Lapper, Boost for Offshore Regulation, FIN.
TIMES (U.K.), Feb. 12, 2007, at 5 ("Hundreds of hedge funds based in the US and Europe
face tighter regulation as the British Virgin Islands prepares legislation that will require
funds registered in the offshore financial centre to conduct regular audits and appoint
whistleblowers to root out fraud.").
25 See, e.g., BORLA & MASETrI, supra note 23, at 75-76; COMPARATIVE JURISDICTION
GUIDE: WHERE TO SET UP AND, PERHAPS, MANAGE A HEDGE FUND?, supra note 23, at 4-5;
Kennard, supra note 23, at 158; Hedging and Betting, supra note 23; Angela MacKay, Bermuda
Looks to Tighten Fund Rules, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), May 5, 2003, at 21; Mairi Mallon, Bermuda-
Changes Are Afoot-Relaxation of Bermuda's Foreign Ownership Laws Is Boosting the Island's Bank
Sector, BANKER, Dec. 1, 2004, at 93.
26 See Testimony Concerning the Regulation of Hedge Funds, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs (2006) (statement of SEC Chairman Christopher Cox)
[hereinafter Cox Statement], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/
ts072506cc.htm ("Nearly two-thirds of endowments invest in hedge funds, and those that
do allocate an average of 18% to them. Whether or not this sort of institutional investment
directly impacts retail investors, it surely is increasing the potential impact that hedge
funds might have on our capital markets.").
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funds.27 Select private U.S. investors have also looked to offshore
hedge funds because of the IRS's favorable tax treatment of these
funds.28 This changed somewhat when Congress enacted the Tax-
payer Relief Act of 1997,29 which "abolished the requirement that the
principal office of a non-U.S. entity that trades for its own accounts
must be outside the United States for that entity to avoid being treated
as engaged in a U.S. trade or business."
30
27 Some data indicate that investments of pensions in hedge funds increased from
$13 billion in 1997 to $72 billion in 2004. See Regulation of the Hedge Fund Industry: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking Hous., and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 27 (2004) (statement
of Charles J. Gradante, Managing Principal, Hennessee Group LLC), available at http://
banking.senate.gov/_files/gradante.pdf; see also Protecting America's Pension Plans from Fraud:
Will Your Savings Retire Before You Do?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor,
and Pensions, 109th Cong. 54 (2006) ("Pension plans and other investors are counting on
the SEC to protect them."); Comment, S. Waters, Individual Investor, on Proposed Rule:
Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 2266, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,172 (Sept. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Waters Comment],
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/swaters9240.htm ("The population most at
risk for exploitation is senior citizens .... When this class of investors roll over their 401Ks
and take their pensions, they may have just enough money to ... become hedge fund
targets. This population is vulnerable with no way to recover financially in old age from
risky investments."); DIV. OF INV. MGMT., supra note 7, at 10; Cynthia M. Fornelli, Regulatory
Risk for Hedge Funds, in MANAGING HEDGE FUND RISK: STRATEGIES AND INSIGHTS FROM INVES-
TORS, COUNTERPARTIES, HEDGE FUNDS AND REGULATORS 359, 363-64 (Virginia Reynolds
Parker ed., 2005); Helen Parry, Hedge Funds, Hot Markets and the High Net Worth Investor: A
Case for Greater Protection ?, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 703, 703 (2001) ("'Hedge funds, so
often booed and hissed by politicians and regulators, are now strutting their stuff in the
limelight to the acclaim of pension funds, unit trusts and private investors.'" (quoting
Sprucing up Their Appearance, MONEY OBSERVER, Sept. 19, 2000)); Carrie Johnson, Appeals
Judges Question SEC's Hedge Fund Rule, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2005, at D I ("Average investors
and pension funds increasingly are investing in... [hedge] funds."); Joseph Nocera, Offer-
ing up An Even Dozen Odds and Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at CI ("Hedge fund manag-
ers need to understand that as they push to become a mainstream part of institutional
investing-used not just by clever endowment managers but also by plain-vanilla pension
funds-they need oversight. Otherwise, they will remain what they are today: the world's
best-paying cottage industry."); Gregory Zuckerman, Hedge Funds Grow Popular with Inves-
tors, WALL ST. J.,Jan. 3, 2006, at R12 ("[1]n 2005.... more institutional investors adopt[ed]
the view that [hedge funds] can play an important role in a portfolio, providing returns
that often don't correlate to the overall stock and bond markets. Pension plans and other
institutional investors increased their allocations to hedge funds .... "). Recently, Con-
gress has suggested its commitment to protect those who have invested pension funds in
hedge funds. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S11429, 11439-41 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2006) (state-
ment of Sen. Arlen Specter) (explaining the Criminal Misuse of Material Nonpublic Infor-
mation and Investor Protection Act of 2006, which called for the registration of hedge
funds, prescribed compliance expectations, and limited investments by pension funds);
Ron Orol, Dodd to Focus on Hedge Funds, DAILY DEAL, Dec. 8, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR
21194614 ("'I'm worried about pensioners, who are not sophisticated investors.... We
bear a responsibility that there is transparency for that kind of investor.'" (quoting Senator
Christopher Dodd, Chairman, Senate Banking Committee)).
28 See HAMMER ET AL., supra note 4, § 4.4(1), at 98.
29 Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.).
30 HAMMER ET AL., supra note 4, § 4.4(1), at 98-99.
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The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 thus extended the U.S. govern-
ment's reach over offshore hedge funds, but offshore hedge funds
nevertheless have remained popular with investors for other reasons.
First, unlike their onshore counterparts, offshore hedge funds can
keep the identities of their investors confidential from the U.S. gov-
ernment.31 Second, U.S. tax-exempt investors, including pension
funds and charitable trusts, prefer offshore funds because they are or-
ganized as corporations and thus do not expose these investors to tax-
ation. By contrast, investing in onshore hedge funds, which are
typically structured as limited partnerships, exposes investors to
taxation.
32
Previously, both onshore and offshore hedge fund advisers did
not have to register with the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act of
194033 in the way that mutual fund advisers must register.34 This dis-
parity created a huge advantage for hedge fund advisers and their in-
vestors, because the registration obligations carry high costs.35 For
example, registered advisers must meet extensive reporting require-
31 See id. § 4.4(1) (i), at 99; THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE
FUNDS: REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE § 8:20, at 205 (2005) ("[T]he activities of many off-
shore fund managers and administrators are still conducted outside the U.S. for a number
of reasons, such as... maintaining investors' anonymity."). Hammer notes, however, that
the offshore fund "reserve[s] its rights to disclose each investor's identity and information
about the investor to cognizant U.S. or non-U.S. governmental authorities to the extent
required under anti-money-laundering laws." HAMMER ET AL., supra note 4, § 4.4(1)(i), at
99.
32 See Div. OF INV. MGMT., supra note 7, at 9.
33 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2000).
34 See Hazen, supra note 9, § 21.2, at 790; Registration Under the Advisers Act of Cer-
tain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054
(Dec. 10, 2004).
35 See, e.g., Barry P. Barbash, Ten Years After Unibanco: The Extraterritorial Reach of the
U.S. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 2002: ADDRESSING
CROSS-BORDER LEGAL & BUSINESS CHALLENGES 335, 339 (2002) ("Compliance with the pro-
visions of the Advisers Act is not an inconsiderable task; the Act imposes significant fiduci-
ary duties, restrictions and responsibilities on entities that come within its definition of
'investment adviser' and that must be registered under the Act."); Paredes, supra note 3, at
1006 ("The SEC paid relatively short shrift to the cost of regulating hedge funds."). Even
for unregistered funds, the need to keep administrative costs low is mounting as the num-
ber of hedge funds multiplies. This increasingly crowded field complicates the hunt for
those winning investment strategies that have made hedge fund investments so desirable.
See, e.g., Regulating Hedge Funds: Thorns in the Foliage, ECONOMIST, Apr. 1, 2006, at 61 ("New
funds are set up almost every day: [A]cross the world there are now more than 8,000.
More dollars are pursuing the same strategies, reducing returns for many."). Some argue
that further oversight will prevent the innovation necessary for even honest hedge funds to
develop winning strategies. See, e.g., Rattner, supra note 1, at 104; Dale A. Oesterle, Regulat-
ingHedgeFunds 2 (Ohio State Univ. Moritz Coll. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper Series No. 71, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract.
id=913045 ("Tighten up hedge fund regulation and we threaten their competitive
advantage.").
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ments and pay an associated annual fee.3 6 They are also subject to
surprise inspections by accountants 3 7 and by the SEC.38 Moreover, re-
gistration as an investment adviser would obligate hedge fund manag-
ers to make the necessary periodic filings under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.39 Finally, registration imposes both a fiduciary
duty4° and a code of ethics 41 on investment advisers.
To avoid registration, nearly all offshore hedge funds relied on
the § 4(2) exemption of the Securities Act of 1933, which applies to
firms that sell securities through a nonpublic offering to accredited
investors. 42 Accredited investors for the purposes of § 4(2) include:
certain institutional investors, registered broker-dealers, ERISA and
other employee benefit plans;43 private business development compa-
nies;44 tax-exempt organizations with assets over $5 million;45 certain
individuals associated with the issuer of the private offering;46 trusts
with $5 million in total assets and investment decisions that a sophisti-
cated person made; 47 individual investors "whose individual net
worth, or joint net worth with that person's spouse, at the time of his
purchase exceeds $1,000,000";48 and individual investors "who had an
individual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most re-
36 See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203A(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(d) (2000); see
also Giselle Abramovich, Hedge Funds Gear up for Registration, MONEY MGMT. EXECUTIVE, Nov.
28, 2005, at 1 ("[T]he hard part is complying with the recordkeeping requirements ...
[which] require[ ] that advisors maintain copies of their policies and procedures along
with any revisions. They must also conduct an annual review of these policies and maintain
all records documenting this review. And they must retain all of these records for five
years."); Zuckerman, supra note 27 ("The move [toward adviser registration] will force
funds to upgrade their compliance and record-keeping efforts, which can create a burden,
especially for smaller funds.").
37 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.206(4)-2, 279.8 (2006).
38 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4.
39 Id. § 78m.
40 See, e.g., Eugene Bilotti, Securities Act Release No. 7490, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 1689, 1997 SEC LEXIS 2628 (Dec. 23, 1997); Alfred C. Rizzo, Investment Ad-
visers Act Release No. 897, 1984 SEC LEXIS 2429 (Jan. 11, 1984); Kidder, Peabody & Co.,
Securities Act Release No. 8426, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 232, 43 S.E.C. 911
(Oct. 16, 1968); Securities Act Release No. 3043, Exchange Act Release No. 3653, Invest-
ment Advisers Act Release No. 40, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,997 (Feb. 5, 1945).
41 See 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2; Investment Adviser Codes of Ethics, 17 C.F.R. § 275.204A-
1 (2004); Investment Adviser Codes of Ethics, Investment Company Act Release No. 26492,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2256, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,696 (July 9, 2004). Scholars,
financial institutions, and government officials have suggested many forms of a code of
conduct. See, e.g., DE BROUWER, supra note 23, at 210; Joseph C.K. Yam, Capital Hows, Hedge
Funds and Market Failure: A Hong Kong Perspective, in CAPITAL FLOWS AND THE INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 164, 164-78 (David Gruen & Luke Gower eds., 1999).
42 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2).
43 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (1) (2006).
44 See id. § 230.501 (a) (2).
45 See id. § 230.501 (a) (3).
46 See id. § 230.501 (a) (4).
47 See id. § 230.501 (a) (7).
48 Id. § 230.501 (a) (5).
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cent years or joint income with that person's spouse in excess of
$300,000 in each of those years and has a reasonable expectation of
reaching the same income level in the current year."49 The common
characteristic of each of these accredited investors is that they are ei-
ther in a position to manage or possess a significant amount of money
such that there is a presumption of financial sophistication.
The Investment Company Act of 1940 also contains two registra-
tion exemptions, §§ 3(c) (1) 50 and 3(c) (7). 5 1 Generally, § 3(c) (1) ex-
cludes funds that are not making a public offering and that have no
more than 100 beneficial owners of their securities.52 Determining
who is a beneficial owner is a thorny issue, 53 but offshore funds bene-
fit from this arrangement because they "need only count U.S. benefi-
cial owners toward the 100-beneficial-owner threshold.'
54
Furthermore, a corporate investor counts as a single beneficial
owner.55 Offshore funds take advantage of this counting method by
organizing as corporations. 56 According to legislative history, Con-
gress chose not to regulate these privately held companies with few
investors because they "do not rise to the level of federal interest
under the Investment Company Act."
5 7
49 Id. § 230.501 (a) (6).
5o Investment Company Act of 1940 § 3(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c) (1) (2000).
51 Id. § 80a-3(c) (7).
52 See id. § 80a-3(c)(1).
53 See Robert W. Helm & Kevin K. Babikian, Creating, Managing And Distributing Off-
shore Investment Products: A Legal Perspective, in NUTS & BOLTS OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 2006:
UNDERSTANDING THE EVOLVING WORLD OF CAPITAL MARKET & INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
PRODUCTS 675, 705-09 (2006).
54 LEMKE ET AL., supra note 31, § 8:16.
55 See Div. OF INV. MGMT., supra note 7, at 11. There is, however, an important excep-
tion to this rule:
If a corporate investor that is a registered investment company, or a com-
pany relying on Section 3(c)(1) or Section 3(c)(7), beneficially owns
[10%] or more of the outstanding voting securities of the Section 3(c)(1)
fund, the Section 3(c) (1) fund must "look-through" that corporate investor
and count each of its investors as a beneficial owner of the Section 3(c)(1)
fund for purposes of the 100-investor limitation. A hedge fund that relies
on Section 3(c) (1) and that accepts investments from registered investment
companies or entities relying on Section 3(c)(1) or Section 3(c)(7), there-
fore, must ensure that those investors do not acquire more than [10%] of
the hedge fund's outstanding voting securities so that the hedge fund may
continue to rely on Section 3(c)(1).
Id. at n.34.
56 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.206(4)-2, 279.8 (2006); HAMMER ET AL., supra note 4, §§ 4.3,
4.4, at 91-110.
57 Div. OF INV. MGMT., supra note 7, at 11-12; see Investment Trusts and Investment Com-
panies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th
Cong. 179 (1940) (statement of David Schenker, Chief Counsel, Securities and Exchange
Commission).
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Funds are likewise exempt from registration under § 3(c) (1) so
long as they make offerings to accredited investors.58 These investors,
according to the Securities Act of 1933, include certain banks, regis-
tered investment companies, small business investment companies,
ERISA plans,59 and individual investors who are accredited "on the
basis of such factors as financial sophistication, net worth, knowledge,
and experience in financial matters, or amount of assets under man-
agement."60 The Securities Act allows accredited investors to invest
through private placements.6 1 Because the Securities Act does not
consider characteristics other than an individual investor's wealth,
some commentators have suggested a broader standard because "the
only way to assure adequate [investor] protection is to require hedge
funds to make an assessment of the level of an investor's sophistica-
tion and determine whether the investor's 'expertise' is suitable for
the investment in question."
62
While § 3(c) (1) exempts hedge funds limited to accredited inves-
tors, § 3(c) (7) exempts funds that do not make public offerings and
have only "qualified purchasers," whose numbers can exceed 100.63
Qualified purchasers include individual investors with investments
worth at least $5 million, family companies with investments worth at
least $5 million, certain trusts, and companies that own or manage
58 See Div. OF INV. MGMT., supra note 7, at 12. Even if the hedge funds can make
offerings to accredited investors, they cannot engage in a general solicitation or general
advertising of their shares. See id.
59 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a) (15) (i) (2000).
60 Id. § 77b(a) (15) (ii); see also Recommendations by the President's Working Group on Fin.
Mkts.: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. 69 (2000) (state-
ment of George Crappie, Chairman, Managed Funds Association) ("[P]rivately offered in-
vestment funds such as hedge funds are offered to sophisticated investors whose ability to
make informed investment decisions and to impose their own demands for information
generally obviate federally-imposed disclosure requirements."); 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.501 (a) (5)-(6) (stating the asset requirements to be an accredited investor as "[a]ny
natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person's spouse, at
the time of his purchase exceeds $1,000,000" or "[a] ny natural person who had an individ-
ual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with
that person's spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years and has a reasonable
expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year").
61 See DE BROUWER, supra note 23, at 13.
62 Edwards, supra note 4, at 44 ("Such a 'suitability' standard would shift the responsi-
bility of limiting access to hedge fund investments to hedge funds and other marketers of
these products, and would relieve investors of the responsibility of determining whether
hedge fund investments are suitable for them."). Many commentators have suggested that
the SEC should pay little attention to investments that accredited investors make. See, e.g.,
Parry, supra note 27, at 718 ("Regulators generally do not spend sleepless nights worrying
about the plight of millionaires who invest unsuccessfully in alternative markets such as
hedge funds. .. ."); John Berlau, Hedge Funds Today: Wo Is Watching the Watchdog?, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 9, 2005, at A14 ("[T]here has been . .. a widespread consensus that [accred-
ited] investors don't need the additional protection of the registration process, and that it
is essential for the capital markets that these entities be able to move quickly.").
63 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 3(c)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c) (7) (2000).
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investments worth at least $25 million.64 In certain situations, "quali-
fied institutional buyers"'65 and "knowledgeable employees" 66 can be
qualified purchasers. Again, offshore funds that rely on the § 3(c) (7)
exemption need only count U.S. investors as qualified purchasers.
67
Given that the definitions of accredited investor and qualified
purchaser include only high-worth individuals, it is clear why the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940 generally exempts hedge funds:68 The
federal government should not bear the responsibility for protecting
high net-worth investors who are in a better financial position to as-
sume risk in their investments.
69
Hedge fund advisers can also take advantage of a fourth exemp-
tion from registration: the Investment Adviser Act's de minimis exemp-
tion, also called the "private adviser exemption."70 The de minimis
exemption excuses from registration "any investment adviser who dur-
ing the course of the preceding twelve months has had fewer than
fifteen clients and who neither holds himself out generally to the pub-
lic as an investment adviser nor acts as an investment adviser to any
[registered] investment company. '71  Legal organizations such as
hedge funds count as only one client under the de minimis exemp-
tion,7 2 because "[i] n computing the number of clients, a limited part-
nership counts as only one client of the general partner or any other
person acting as investment adviser to the partnership.
'7 3
B. SEC Registration Provisions for Hedge Fund Advisers
Following a 2004 three-to-two vote by the SEC Commissioners,
many hedge fund advisers could no longer take advantage of the de
minimis exemption.7 4 By eliminating the de minimis exemption, the
64 See id. § 80a-2(a) (51) (A).
65 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a51-1(g) (1).
66 Id. § 270.3c-5.
67 See LEME ET AL., supra note 31, § 8:16.
68 See, e.g., DE BROUWER, supra note 23, at 14.
69 See id. ("The rationale is clear-the law is involved to protect investors from ex-
ploitation, but very high-worth individuals who choose to invest in risky ventures [such as
hedge funds] are well placed to make their own investment choices and defend their own
interests."); see also H. X 2924-The Hedge Fund Disclosure Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Capital Mkts., Sec. and Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 106th
Cong. 1 (2000) (statement of Rep. Richard H. Baker, Chairman, Subcomm. on Capital
Markets, Sec. and Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs.)
("Because hedge fund investors are presumed to be capable of judging risk and bearing
the losses that follow from a bad mistake, the failure of hedge funds has not been a public
policy concern.").
70 LEMKE ET AL., supra note 31, at 2 (Supp. Jan. 2005).
7' 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2000).
72 See Div. or INv. MCMT., supra note 7, at 21.
73 PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 1, at B-3; see also 17 C.F.R.
275.203(b) (3)-I (2006).
74 See Hazen, supra note 9, § 21.2[3].
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SEC required hedge fund advisers to employ a new method for count-
ing their clients. 75 The new rule76 adopted a look-through approach
and "no longer count[ed] a [hedge] fund as one advisory client but
rather look[ed] through to the fund's investors as advisory clients."
77
Nevertheless, the SEC adopted a completely different counting
method for certain offshore advisers: 78 The SEC allowed those who
"ha[d their] principal office and place of business outside the United
States"-almost all offshore hedge funds-to treat their fund and not
their investors as clients.
79
The registration regulations did not change the minimum level
of assets that a hedge fund adviser must manage to mandate registra-
tion with the SEC.80 This decision runs against the suggestions of
75 See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2.
76 The new rule does not literally apply to hedge funds. Rather, hedge funds fall
under the definition of "private funds" and thus the registration requirements apply. See
id. § 275.203(b)(3)-2(a); see also Waters Comment, supra note 27 ("Labeling hedge funds is
critical. Today, identifying whether an investment is a hedge fund can be almost impossi-
ble for the individual investor.").
77 Hazen, supra note 9, § 21.2[3] (explaining the provisions of 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.203(b) (3)-2(c)); see also Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund
Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,065 (Dec. 10,
2004). This approach, according to many hedge fund attorneys, was contrary to prior
readings of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. See, e.g., Comment, Paul N. Roth, Partner,
Schulte Roth & Zabel, on Proposed Rule: Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain
Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2266, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,172
(Sept. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Schulte Roth & Zabel Comment], http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s73004/schulte091504.pdf ("We believe that Rule 203(b) (3)-I as currently writ-
ten is consistent with Congressional intent, accurately reflects legislative history and repre-
sents sound policy-that an adviser's client is the fund, not the investors in the fund."
(emphasis added)); Comment, Marianne K. Smythe, Louis R. Cohen &James E. Anderson,
Partners, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, on Proposed Rule: Registration Under
the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
2266, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,172, at 1 (Sept. 8, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s73004/wilmer090804.pdf ("Counting clients by the 'look through' method the Commis-
sion now proposes is contrary to the text and the entire history of the Advisers Act.").
78 See, e.g., Carbon 360", The Operational "Do's and Don'ts" of Hedge Fund Registration, in
IT'S THE RULE: THE NEW SEC ADVISER REGULATION FOR HEDGE FUNDS 88, 98 (2005), http://
www.hedgeworld.com/download/secadviser-regulation.pdf.
79 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b) (3)-2(c).
80 SeeJohn P. Moriarty & Curtlan R. McNeily, Registration Under the Advisers Act for
Hedge Fund Advisers, in 19A REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PLANNERS, § 3:51, at 3-137 (2006).
The SEC in late 2006 considered raising the minimum asset level for individual investors.
See, e.g., Jenny Anderson, Barring the Hedge Fund Doors to Mere Millionaires, N.Y. TIMES, at C9;
Kathleen Pender, Hedge Fund Investing Reforms Considered, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 10, 2006, at Fl.
The current minimum asset levels have not changed since 1982. See Chris Clair, SEC Pro-
poses New Hedge Fund Rules, HEDGEWORLD NEWS, Dec. 14, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR
21602815 ("[I]n 1982, when the accredited investor rules were implemented, roughly
1.87% of U.S. households would have qualified to invest in hedge funds. Currently be-
cause of inflation and rising U.S. personal wealth in general, about 8.5% of U.S. house-
holds meet the accredited investor standards.").
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many industry insiders.8 ' The SEC, however, contended that includ-
ing the minimum asset level in federal regulation would violate state
regulation, as forty-nine states already have statutory minimums for
registered advisers.8 2 Moreover, when calculating a hedge fund's as-
sets to determine whether registration is necessary, "[a] n adviser [has
to] exclude proprietary assets invested in the fund, and need not in-
clude the value of assets attributable to non-U.S. investors."
8 3
According to some commentators, the registration requirement
was part of the SEC's effort to increase regulation of offshore funds.
8 4
In a report that the SEC issued:
The SEC has chosen to limit... extraterritorial application . .. by
providing that an offshore adviser to an offshore private fund may
treat the fund . . . and not the investors . . . as its client for most
purposes under the Act. The offshore adviser will register under
the Act and keep certain books and records as required by SEC
rules, and will remain subject to examinations by SEC staff. Other
requirements, including the... compliance rule, custody rule, and
proxy voting rule, would not apply to the registered offshore ad-
viser. In addition, SEC staff is exploring ways to obtain and share
information with foreign authorities with oversight of hedge fund
advisers that may register with the SEC.
8 5
81 See Comment, Dixie L. Johnson, Chair, Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec.; Diane
E. Ambler & Robert Todd Lang, Co-Chairs, Task Force on Hedge Fund Regulation, Sec-
tion of Bus. Law, Am. Bar Ass'n, on Proposed Rule: Registration Under the Advisers Act of
Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2266, 69 Fed. Reg.
45,172, at 7-8 (Sept. 28, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/aba092804
.pdf; Comment, Patricia A. Poglinco & Robert B. Van Grover, Partners, Seward & Kissel
LLP, on Proposed Rule: Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advis-
ers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2266, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,172, at 7 (Sept. 15, 2004)
[hereinafter Seward & Kissel Comment], http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/
poglinco09l5O4.pdf (suggesting that the SEC apply a $100 million threshold to offshore
advisers); Comment, David Wright, Director, European Commission, on Proposed Rule:
Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 2266, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,172, at 4 (Sept. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Wright Com-
ment], http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/dwrightO91504.pdf.
82 See Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, In-
vestment Advisers Act Release No. 1633, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,112, 28,119-20 (May 22, 1997).
83 Moriarty & McNeily, supra note 80, § 3:51, at 3-138; see Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Form
ADV: Instructions for Part IA, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv-instructions.pdf.
84 See Hazen, supra note 9, § 21.2[3]; Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Pro-
poses Securities Offering Reform, Requires Registration of Hedge Fund Investment Advis-
ers (Oct. 27, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-150.htm. The hedge fund
adviser registration requirement will trigger more state law involvement in hedge fund
regulation because the states have jurisdiction over many advisers. See, e.g., New Rules for
Hedge Fund Advisers May Prompt SEC to Seek Help from States, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
1986 (Nov. 8, 2004).
85 Office of Int'l Affairs, Office of International Affairs Outline, in 2 THE SEC SPEAKS IN
2005, at 683, 691-92 (Annette L. Nazareth & Paul F. Roye eds., 2005); see LEME ET AL.,
supra note 31, at 2 (Supp. Jan. 2005).
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Essentially, the SEC's Office of International Affairs allowed several
obvious loopholes for offshore funds and their advisers. The Office of
International Affairs explained that it was "exploring ways to obtain
and share information with foreign authorities"86 rather than provid-
ing actual regulatory guidance to offshore funds and their advisers.
C. Criticisms of the Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Rule
Despite the SEC's assertion that the registration provisions of the
Investment Advisers Act would strengthen regulation of offshore
hedge funds, letters that industry leaders sent to the SEC during the
rule-making stage suggested that these provisions would be insuffi-
cient to regulate offshore funds and advisers. 87 For example, one in-
dustry leader said that mandatory registration would encourage some
hedge fund advisers to relocate offshore, which would defeat the ef-
fectiveness of the regulations. 88 Similarly, former Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Alan Greenspan commented that "[a] ny direct U.S.
regulations restricting [the hedge funds'] flexibility will doubtless in-
duce the more aggressive funds to emigrate from under our jurisdic-
tion .... If the funds move abroad, our oversight will diminish."8 9
The movement of funds overseas and the resulting loss of U.S. juris-
diction contravene the SEC's goal of protecting investors from unfit
advisers and potential fraud.
The implications of registration create additional concerns. First,
depending on their fund's structure, some hedge fund managers, par-
ticularly managers of previously unregistered and smaller funds,
might find the registration requirements difficult to meet.90 Second,
with registration comes implied fiduciary duties and the SEC's
mandatory disclosure and filing requirements.91 Additionally, the
SEC likely lacks adequate resources to deal with the periodic filings,
86 Office of Int'l Affairs, supra note 85, at 692.
87 See, e.g., Letter from John G. Gaine, President, Managed Funds Ass'n, to The Hon-
orable William H. Donaldson, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Nov. 21, 2003), available
at 1422 PLI/Corp 777 (Westlaw).
88 See id.
89 Id.
90 See, e.g., Seward & Kissel Comment, supra note 81 ("[W]e believe that the required
registration of private fund advisers ... will likely cause many smaller advisers to close.");
Christopher Faille, The Cost of Compliance, in IT'S THE RULE: THE NEW SEC ADVISER REGULA-
TION FOR HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 78, at 30, 30 ("What this rule is going to do... is make
it virtually impossible to take .. . $50 million or .. . $75 million and start a hedge fund.
The costs associated with this are a huge hurdle."). For an example of a rule that would
affect hedge fund managers once they register, see Maintenance of the Indicia of Owner-
ship of Plan Assets Outside the Jurisdiction of the District Courts of the United States, 29
C.F.R. § 2550.404b-1(a) (2) (2006).
91 See Hazen, supra note 9, § 21.3[1].
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while few hedge funds likely have the infrastructure in place to meet
the necessary reporting requirements. 92
Immediately prior to the effective date of the registration regula-
tion, members of the hedge fund and mutual fund industries, attor-
neys who specialize in hedge fund regulation, worldwide regulators,
and academics formally challenged the regulation. One hedge fund
manager, Phillip Goldstein, took the SEC to federal court to challenge
the registration regulation, 9-3 alleging that the SEC exceeded its au-
thority in adopting the rule,94 that the rule was "not a reasonable in-
terpretation of the [Investment] Advisers Act,"95 and that the rule was
"arbitrary and capricious."96 Initially, legal commentators speculated
that Goldstein's arguments would not hold any weight in court97 be-
cause they believed that "'[i]f the SEC wants oversight in a particular
jurisdiction, they're going to get it.' "98
Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit invalidated the registration re-
quirement.99 Circuit Judge Arthur Raymond Randolph examined the
ambiguous meaning of the term "client" in the Investment Advisers
Act'00 and discussed the duties that arise in an adviser-client context,
including a fiduciary duty and a duty of loyalty. 101 Judge Randolph
held that the SEC had "not adequately explained how the relationship
between hedge fund investors and advisers justifies treating the for-
mer as clients of the latter."10 2 The D.C. Circuit was so emphatic in its
rejection of the registration requirement that days after the invalida-
tion, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox issued a statement declaring
that the SEC would not seek en banc review.' 0 3
92 See James M. Amend, CCOs Wrestle over Reporting to the SEC: Also Worry What to Do
When Management Resists Change, MONEY MGMT. EXECUTIVE, Jan. 30, 2006, available at 2006
WLNR 1640541.
93 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see Walter Hamilton, Suit Tests
SEC Rule on Hedge Funds, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2006, at Cl; Siobhan Hughes, Moving the Mar-
ket: Hedge Fund Sues to Block Registry of Advisers by SEC, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2004, at C3.
94 See Brief of Petitioners at 26, Goldstein v. SEC, No. 04-1434 (D.C. Cir. June 23,
2005) [hereinafter Brief of Petitioners].
95 Id. at 35.
96 Id. at 47.
97 See, e.g., Jeff Benjamin, Suit over Hedge Fund Registration on, But Industry Isn't Holding
Its Breath, INV. NEWS, Oct. 17, 2005, at 3 ("[T]here are many in the hedge fund industry
who are not pinning their hopes on a victory for [the adviser] .... To some, the lawsuit is
little more than a desperate attempt at finding a loophole.").
98 Id. (quoting JeffJoseph, Managing Director, Alternative Investments, Rydex Global
Advisors, Inc.).
99 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
100 See id. at 878-84 ("The client of a laundry occupies a very different position than
the client of a lawyer.").
101 See id. at 879-80 (discussing Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985)).
102 Id. at 882.
103 See S.E.C. Decides It Won't Appeal on Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2006, at C9
("'[F]urther appeal would be futile and would simply delay and distract from our goal of
advancing investor protection.'" (quoting SEC Chairman Christopher Cox)); Press Re-
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II
THE SEC's INACTION IN RESPONSE TO CONCERNS FROM MUTUAL FUND
AND LEGAL INSIDERS DURING THE RULE-MAKING PROCESS AND
POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF IGNORING REGISTRATION OF OFFSHORE
HEDGE FUNDS
A. SEC Inaction
According to a 1999 statement from the President's Working
Group on Financial Markets,' 0 4 "requiring hedge fund managers to
register as investment advisers would not seem to be an appropriate
method to monitor hedge fund activity."' 0 5 Despite this statement,
the SEC conducted a comment period after drafting the Proposed
Rule, 10 6 taking comments from both its staff 0 7 and the public. 10 8
Some commentators argued that the comment period was insufficient
"to solicit meaningful input on this important proposal" 10 9 and indi-
lease, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement of Chairman Cox Concerning the Decision of the
U.S. Court of Appeals in Philip Goldstein, et al. v. SEC (Aug. 7, 2006), http://sec.gov/news/
press/2006/2006-135.htm.
104 The President's Working Group on Financial Markets is a group comprised of lead-
ing members of the Department of the Treasury, Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, the SEC, and the CFTC. See Exec. Order No. 12,631, 53 Fed. Reg. 9,421
(Mar. 18, 1988).
105 PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 1, at B-16 (emphasis ad-
ded); see also Comment, Sheila C. Bair, Dean's Professor of Fin. Regulatory Policy, Univ. of
Massachusetts-Amherst, Former Assistant Sec'y for Fin. Insts., U.S. Dep't of the Treasury,
Former Comm'r and Acting Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, on Pro-
posed Rule: Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Invest-
ment Adviser Act Release No. 2266, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,172, at 3 (Sept. 15, 2004) [hereinafter
Bair Comment], http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/scbair091504.pdf ("Given
the fact that hedge funds do not account for a disproportionate share of fraud cases, it
would seem that market discipline is by and large working. SEC registration could weaken
that discipline.").
106 See, e.g., Comment, Managed Funds Ass'n, on Proposed Rule: Registration Under
the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
2266, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,172, at 1 (Oct. 18, 2004) [hereinafter MFA Comment], http://www
.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/mfa101804.pdf ("The SEC received 156 letters as of Oc-
tober 13th, 124 of which were either for or against the proposal. The overwhelming num-
ber of the 124 comment letters that took a position opposed the SEC Proposal .
(citation omitted)).
107 See, e.g., Div. OF INV. MGMT., supra note 7.
108 See, e.g., MFA Comment, supra note 106, at 1 ("Those who oppose this proposal
include not only major hedge fund groups, industry participants, the leading trade associa-
tion representing this industry and top legal professionals and law firms who represent
hedge fund managers, but also major business groups such as the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce.").
109 Comment, GeorgeJ. Mazin & David A. Vaughan, Dechert LLP, on Proposed Rule:
Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 2266, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,172 (Aug. 24, 2004) (emphasis added), http://www
.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/mazin82404.pdf. SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins, an
opponent of the registration requirement, was particularly outspoken in the months after
the SEC adopted the requirement about the SEC's ineffective approach in doing so. See,
e.g., James M. Amend, Hedge Funds Suffer High Anxiety as Registration Nears, MONEY MGMT.
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cated that the "limitation of the comment period . .. was obviously
designed to reduce comment on the proposed rule." 110
In adopting the final rule, the SEC ignored important sugges-
tions,'I' both internal and external. Namely, the SEC did not specify
the types of disclosures it would mandate for registered fund advis-
ers,1 1 2 require "Board Adopted Valuation Procedures," 1 3 identify and
encourage industry "Best Practices,"' 1 4 or develop programs for inves-
tor education.
1 1 5
B. Likely Creation of Parallel Funds Offshore to Avoid
Registration Requirements and Movement of U.S.
Investors' Funds to Offshore Havens
Because of the ambiguity regarding how the registration require-
ments pertained to offshore hedge funds,116 onshore hedge funds
could still create "two parallel funds, one fund for non-qualified inves-
tors which is subject to the 100 holder limit, and a second fund solely
for qualified investors which can admit an unlimited number of quali-
EXECUTIVE, Dec. 12, 2005, at 7 ("In a recent speech deriding what he called an 'undis-
ciplined approach' to rulemaking at the SEC, Commissioner Paul Atkins said, 'We are
discovering that the benefits of registration might fall short of our expectations, since [the
registration form] will not yield the type of information that would be needed for mean-
ingful oversight."'); Mark Hendrickson, Commissioner Atkins Says Hedge Fund Rules Stretch
SEC Too Thin, SEC. WK., Oct. 10, 2005, at 7 ("[SEC Commissioner Paul] Atkins... criticized
the agency for not listening to other regulators at the time the hedge fund rule was
adopted."); Jaime Levy Pessin & Phyllis Plitch, SEC's Atkins: Hedge-Fund Rule Yields Little Info
So Far, Dow JONES NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 9, 2005 ("'Now our own staff is saying, duh, we're
not getting the information we need.'" (quoting Commissioner Atkins in a speech at a
Securities Industry Association conference on November 9, 2005)).
110 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 94, at 52.
11t See, e.g., MFA Comment, supra note 106, at I ("[M]any commentators provided
alternatives to the SEC Proposal that, to our knowledge, the Commission has yet to con-
sider."); Comment, Richard M. Whiting, Executive Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Fin. Servs. Round-
table, on Proposed Rule: Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund
Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2266, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,172, at 3 (Sept. 15,
2004) [hereinafter Fin. Servs. Roundtable Comment], http://www.sec.gov/rules/pro-
posed/s73004/rmwhitingO91504.pdf ("[T]here are other, less intrusive methods to
achieve the goals identified by the Commission.").
1 12 See Div. OF INV. MGMT., supra note 7, at x, 96-97.
113 Id. at 99.
114 Id. at x, 101.
115 See id. at x, 103. Investor education is not a point that should have been lost on the
SEC, particularly following a false news release the agency placed on the Internet, advertis-
ing the fictitious hedge fund Guaranteed Returns Diversified Inc. (Symbol GRDI, pro-
nounced "Greedy"). See Joseph Hellrung, Hedge Fund Regulation: Investors Are Knocking at
the Door, But Can the SEC Clean House Before Eveiyone Rushes In?, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 317,
317 (2005). The funds advertised on the hedge fund's Web site included one that claimed
to have generated returns of 148% since 2000 and another that claimed to have consistent
returns of up to 99%. See id. "Despite the outrageous claims by [the fund], the site re-
ceived over 80,000 hits in a ten month period." Id.
116 See supra Part I.B.
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fied purchasers."' 17 The adviser therefore could continue to avoid re-
gistration. This structure took advantage of the preexisting loophole
that foreign investors do not count toward the hundred-person limita-
tion. 1 8 In practice, however, some funds found such a drastic altera-
tion in fund structure too inconvenient and opted to register. 19
C. Increased Risk of Fraud
Simply put, "[f]raud is bad."' 20 One of the SEC's goals in enact-
ing the registration regulation was to prevent fraud, and some com-
mentators believed that the hedge fund registration requirement
would force hedge funds "to become a lot more open as SEC regula-
tors increase their surveillance over the financial markets in an effort
to protect investors."'21 Other commentators have noted that "[t]he
117 Joel Scharfstein & Brian Kniesly, Section 7704 and Publicly (or Non Publicly) Traded
Partnerships, in 10 TAx PLANNING FOR DOMESTIC & FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, JOINT VEN-
TURES & OTHER STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 2005, at 275, 288 (2005); see also Recommendations by
the President's Working Group on Financial Markets: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking and
Fin. Serus., 106th Cong. 9 (2000) (statement of Hon. Richard H. Baker, Chairman, Sub-
comm. on Capital Markets, Securities and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the
House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services) ("I do not support regulating hedge
funds directly. I do not want to take any action that would result in the relocation of this
industry to an unregulated offshore domicile."); H.R. 2924-The Hedge Fund Disclosure Act:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Secs. and Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm.
on Banking and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. 5 (2000) (statement of Rep. Patrick J. Toomey)
("[This move toward regulation] will be detrimental to American financial institutions, in
part by encouraging hedge fund activity to just take place offshore, beyond the reach of
American regulators."); Fin. Servs. Roundtable Comment, supra note 111, at 2
("[A] dditional regulation of hedge fund advisers could lead them to relocate offshore.");
PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 1, at 42, 43 ("It is possible ... that
directly regulating these institutions could drive some of them offshore, which could make
regulation less effective.... The increase in cross-border financial flows... highlights the
importance of an appropriate financial regulatory structure."); Julie Dalla-Costa, Guarding
Against Hedge Fund Fraud, EUROMONEY (U.K.), Nov. 2004, at 58 (describing how hedge fund
adviser Charles L. Harris admitted to moving funds offshore).
118 See Scharfstein & Kniesly, supra note 117, at 288.
119 See id.
120 Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 775, 824
(2006).
121 Jack O'Hara, Hedge Funds Likely to Receive Additional Scrutiny, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
June 14, 2005, at 5; see, e.g., Alexander M. Ineichen, On Myths, Bubbles and New Paradigms in
the Hedge Fund Industry, in HEDGE FUNDS: RISKS AND REGULATION, supra note 1, at 3, 3
("Hedge fund managers have different incentives than Wall Street talking heads where
self-promotion is a key to success. If you have a trading strategy or investment process with
superior risk/reward trade-off in absolute return space, why do you want to tell it to the
world for free . . . ?"); Nocera, supra note 27 ("Hedge fund managers fear that the [SEC]
isn't sophisticated enough to understand their complex trading strategies .... Secrecy is
the Achilles' heel of the hedge fund industry. It's scary that nobody knows what hedge
funds are doing.... ."); see also Davis Comment, supra note 1 ("The potential for abuse for
investors in hedge funds, as well as to the general public who invests in securities contem-
poraneously, is enormous."); Gary Duncan, Hedge Funds-Weapons of Mass Financial Destruc-
tion, TIMES (U.K.), Oct. 25, 2004, at 22 ("[T]he burgeoning operations of hedge funds
[are] operations that may now pose a threat greater than Saddam Hussein and his elusive
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growth in hedge funds has.., been accompanied by troubling growth
in the number of... hedge fund enforcement cases."' 22 The number
of hedge fund enforcement cases will most likely grow, and ineffective
SEC regulation has led some lawmakers to investigate alternative ways
to rein in hedge funds.
1 23
weapons of mass destruction."). But see H.R. 2924-The Hedge Fund Disclosure Act: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Secs. and Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Bank-
ing and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. 4 (2000) (statement of Rep. PatrickJ. Toomey) ("Requiring
hedge funds to disclose the risks that they are taking reveals the nature of their business
strategy in a way that would be comparable to requiring Mrs. Field to reveal the recipe and
the baking instructions of her cookies."); MFA Comment, supra note 106, at 2 ("Although
the SEC claims that its proposal is not aimed to govern the activities of the funds them-
selves, this new regime will hurt hedge fund investors and capital markets by impeding
entrepreneurial efforts that characterize the industry's diversity and innovation."); Seward
& Kissel Comment, supra note 81, at 2 ("[W]e believe that the required registration of
private fund advisers would have a substantial chilling effect on the industry .... ); From-
son, supra note 2 ("Instead of demonizing hedge funds, we should be applauding them.");
Hamilton, supra note 93 ("[T]he rule would do nothing to combat fraud but would raise
investor costs and sap some of the nimbleness that has made hedge funds successful. They
are a big part of what's keeping the economy growing and you don't want to hobble
that...." (internal quotations omitted)); Hendrickson, supra note 109, at 7 ("(SEC Com-
missioner Paul] Atkins said the hedge fund industry's current approach toward developing
sound practice guidelines would do far more than SEC registration to enable investors 'to
sleep at night.' He said development of the sound practice guidelines belies the notion
that unregistered hedge fund advisers 'operate largely in the shadows, with little over-
sight."'); Punater, supra note 2, at 4 ("The more time spent on compliance and dealing
with regulatory issues, the less time spent on their core activities. Regulation... does not
guarantee a level of performance; it will only increase management's involvement in non-
investment-related activities, potentially leading to lagging performance and then to the
very issue of mitigating risk with which regulators are concerned."). Even bloggers have
noticed the recent fraud scandals within the alternative investment arena. See, e.g., Greg
Newton, It's Time to Pull for Phil NAKEDSHoRTS, http://nakedshorts.typepad.com/naked
shorts/2005/10/its-time-to-pul.html (Oct. 30, 2005) ("Refco chief accounts receivable of-
ficer Phil Bennett apparently can't find... six people to cosign his $50 million bond .... I
must admit that my original reaction was: 'Tough. You can have John Gotti's old space at
The Tombs where you can hang out while Sandy Maggio makes like Sammy The Bull."').
122 Roye Speech, supra note 2 ("In the last five years, the Commission has brought 51
cases involving hedge fund fraud, resulting in losses of more than $1.1 billion. These cases
are more than [10%] of cases against investment advisers over the same period."); see Wil-
liam P. Barrett, Hedgehogs, FORBES, Nov. 14, 2005, at 46 ("Regulatory claims of fraud by
hedge fund managers seem all the rage . . . ."); see, e.g., Britney Hit by Hedge Fund Scandal,
AccourrAcyv, June 1, 2003, at 77 ("A hedge fund scandal in the British Virgin Islands has
claimed Britney Spears and former Sotheby's chairman Alfred Taubman as victims. They
were among the investors who lost money when the . . . fund collapsed."); Nancy R. Man-
dell, Hedge Funds Beware: Ready Or Not, Here Comes Regulation, SEC. WK., Sept. 19, 2005
("'The increasing number of hedge funds means increasing pressure on them to perform,
which ... can only lead to fraud."' (quoting SEC Commissioner Roel C. Campos));Janet
Novack, Offshore Mystery, FORBES, Oct. 17, 2005, at 58; Emily Thornton, Call It 'Grounds for
Suspicion,' Bus. WK., Oct. 31, 2005, at 9 ("The [SEC] has accused an Ohio stockbroker in
federal court with collecting millions of dollars for a bogus hedge fund-and then pouring
some of that money into his coffee shop.").
123 See, e.g., Hedge Funds and Independent Analysts: How Independent Are Their Relation-
ships?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 369 (2006) (statement of
Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary), available at 2006 WLNR
11262786 (stating that if the SEC is unable to find ways to regulate fraudulent hedge funds,
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There is an industry-wide concern that the registration require-
ment would give the public a false sense of security about investing in
hedge funds. 124 As the number of American millionaires who qualify
as accredited investors and sophisticated investors increases, these
new millionaires will likely jump into hedge fund investment. 125 New
tools on the market will aid these investors in making their invest-
ments.1 26 For instance, investors today have access to online informa-
then criminal authorities will have to play a larger role in regulation). Even after the invali-
dation of the registration requirement regulation, Congress and other lawmakers did not
stop trying to find ways to regulate hedge funds. See, e.g., Cox Statement, supra note 26, at
3 ("Hedge funds are not, should not be, and will not be unregulated. The challenge for
the SEC and the President's Working Group going forward is, rather, to what extent to add
new regulations, particularly in light of the recent Court of Appeals ruling."); Carol E.
Curtis, Turf Wars over Hedge Funds, SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS, Aug. 21, 2006, at 8, available at 2006
WLNR 14457108 (detailing the increased regulatory discussion by the Treasury Depart-
ment, Congress, and the SEC); Hedge Funds and the SEC, ECONOMIST, July 1, 2006, at 22
("Christopher Cox, the head of the SEC, has said that the agency will 're-evaluate' its op-
tions."); Ron Orol, SEC to Restore Hedge-Fund Law, DAILY DEAL, July 26, 2006, available at
2006 WLNR 12861876 ("'We are moving as quickly as we can to, if not to put Humpty
Dumpty back together again, to erect something sturdier that will accomplish the same
objectives,' [SEC Chairman Christopher] Cox told lawmakers at a Senate Banking Com-
mittee hearing on the hedge fund industry."). But see, e.g., Josh Mecham, Senate Witnesses
Say No More Regulation Needed, MONDAQ, May 22, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 8775157.
One member of the House even went so far as to introduce a bill that would have the same
effect as the SEC's registration requirement regulation but with Congress's lawmaking
power behind it. See Frank Introduces Hedge Fund Bill, EUROMONEY, July 3, 2006, at 2, availa-
ble at 2006 WLNR 13260460. Retail customers, calling hedge funds "regulatory black
hole[s]," have also demanded increased oversight. Michael Peltz, Not in My Backyard, INsTI-
TUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1, 2006, at 36-38 (quoting testimony of Connecticut Attorney
General Richard Blumenthal before the Senate Judiciary Committee on June 28, 2006).
124 See, e.g., Bair Comment, supra note 105, at 1-2 ("[I]t is far from clear whether
requiring hedge fund advisers to register with the SEC will help or inadvertently harm
investors by creating unrealistic expectations .... perhaps emboldening investors who
otherwise would not invest in such funds to do so, out of the belief that the SEC will
protect them."); Parry, supra note 27, at 719 ("The relatively new rich are particularly ripe
targets for unscrupulous ... hedge fund advisers and managers."). The public generally
finds out about certain funds through word of mouth because the law historically has not
permitted hedge funds to solicit funds from the public. See, e.g., Davis Comment, supra
note 1 ("Hedge funds relatively new to the public now are starting to reach the mainstream
media."); DE BROUWER, supra note 23, at 13; Drv. OF INv. MGMT., supra note 7, at ix-x, 16;
PRESIDENT'S' WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 1, at 3.
125 See, e.g., O'Hara, supra note 121, at 5; Parry, supra note 27, at 719 ("Unlike the
traditional . . . target for an investment scam . . . 'Aunt Agatha'-a term redolent with
images of elderly upper class spinsters, replete with inherited wealth but with no husband
to look after it-the new rich of today are more likely to be entertainers, sports stars or
those who have amassed wealth in the dot.com sector, and they may have practically no
knowledge of or experience of any significance with financial markets or investing."). For
definitions of accredited and sophisticated investors, see supra text accompanying notes
50-67.
126 See, e.g., BORLA & MASETri, supra note 23, at 79 ("Within the world of hedge
funds .... we are seeing the emergence of a series of associations, web sites, or-
gani[z]ations and speciali[z]ed organi[z]ations whose objective is to provide information,
research, reports, databases and organi[z]e conferences and events.").
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tion tools 127 and can investigate hedge funds on their own-for a
cost-by hiring detective agencies that specialize in hedge fund
investigation. 1
28
These investigative tools may give the average U.S. investor a false
sense of security, thus exposing an increasing number of American
households to fraud. 29 Currently, not only is it difficult for the aver-
age investor to garner information about hedge funds (short of hiring
one of the private agencies), 130 but hedge funds are also inherently
riskier than the typical investment vehicles in which the average U.S.
investors currently entrust their money. However, despite the recent
mutual fund scandals,1 31 a great deal of curiosity surrounds hedge
fund investment. 13 2 Thus, the SEC needs to be diligent in providing
measures to protect investors who may be accredited or qualified1 33 by
definition but perhaps are not so in actuality.
1 34
III
How OTHER U.S. REGULATORY BODIES HAVE DEALT WITH
THE OFFSHORE PROBLEM
A. Internal Revenue Service
Historically, offshore hedge funds were an investment haven be-
cause of U.S. tax law's favorable treatment. 1 5 As long as the offshore
fund is deemed not to be "engaged in a U.S. trade or business," the
127 See, e.g., Tergesen, supra note 20.
128 See, e.g., Jane J. Kim, Digging for Hedge Fund Dirt, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2005, at C1;
Anne Tergesen, Hedge Fund Sleuths, Bus. WK., Nov. 21, 2005, at 142 ("[The investigative
firms'] fees range from $1,000 to $30,000, depending on the number of funds or managers
involved .... If a manager has spent time overseas, they'll investigate there.").
129 See, e.g., Hellrung, supra note 115, at 329; Erik J. Greupner, Note, Hedge Funds Are
Headed Down-Market: A Callfor Increased Regulation?, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1555, 1573-78
(2003); Lori Pizzani, Registered Hedge Funds Gain in Popularity, INVESTMENT MGMT. WKLtv.,
May 3, 2004, at 7. But see, e.g., Helm & Babikian, supra note 53, at 796-97; Jeff Benjamin,
Hedge Funds May Gain New Fans: Registration Makes Them More Palatable to Financial Advisers,
INVESTMENT NEWS, Nov. 1, 2004, at 1 ("[The] decision by the [SEC] to require the majority
of hedge fund managers to register as investment advisers could have the unintended con-
sequence of creating a seal of approval for the $870 billion hedge fund industry."). Be-
cause the new regulations will give the guise that investment in U.S. funds will have
improved antifraud measures, larger funds' investments will likely move offshore, away
from the SEC's arm of regulation, thus increasing the risk of fraud.
130 See supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
131 See Rory B. O'Halloran, Comment, An Overview and Analysis of Recent Interest in In-
creased Hedge Fund Regulation, 79 TUL. L. REv. 461, 489-90 (2004).
132 See supra note 2.
133 For definitions of accredited and sophisticated investors, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 50-67.
134 See supra note 122.
135 See Helm & Babikian, supra note 53, at 773-75. Little has been done to legislate for
the movement of funds offshore to avoid U.S. taxes. See, e.g., C. Bryan Cloyd et al., Firm
Valuation Effects of the Expatriation of U.S. Corporations to Tax-Haven Countries, J. Am. TAX'N
AsS'N,Jan. 1, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 5773157; Amy Hamilton, REPO Act Targets Inver-
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IRS will impose only a withholding tax on certain income. 3 6 Because
of this loophole, hedge fund advisers strive to ensure that they are not
"engaged in a U.S. trade or business." 137 Arguably, this loophole pro-
tects U.S. investors from offshore hedge fund solicitation. Yet, even
though hedge funds cannot advertise to the public, they seem un-
deterred from finding U.S. investors because U.S. investors are a hot-
bed of assets.
1 3 8
Although the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 eliminated some of the
previous favorable treatment toward offshore entities,13 9 the IRS still
affords offshore hedge funds multiple loopholes. For instance, fund
investors bear a great tax burden if the fund is deemed to be a "for-
eign corporation" with U.S. investors owning "more than 50[%] of...
the total combined voting power of all classes of stock of [the offshore
hedge fund] entitled to vote, or the total value of the stock of such
[offshore fund] ."140 The IRS would consider the fund a "controlled
foreign corporation" 141 (CFC) and would tax its U.S. investors at an
unfavorable rate. 142 Offshore hedge funds can generally avoid CFC
status by organizing as a noncorporation, such as a limited liability
partnership, such that the fund "is less likely to be considered a
CFC."1143
Offshore funds are also careful to ensure that they do not fall
under the U.S. Treasury Department's rules for "passive foreign in-
vestment companies" (PFICs). 144 Under these rules, the IRS taxes cer-
tain distributions from PFICs to U.S. investors at the highest possible
rate for individuals and subjects these distributions to a deferred inter-
sions; Are Offshore Hedge Funds Next?, 95 TAX NOTES 287 (2002); Robert Willens, The Bermuda
Angle, DAILY DEAL, Apr. 17, 2002, available at 2002 WLNR 3532666.
136 I.R.C. § 881(a) (2000).
137 Id.
138 Offshore funds can make public offerings to U.S. investors only pursuant to an SEC
order because § 7(d) of the Investment Company Act prohibits any company organized
outside the United States from using the U.S. mails or facilities of interstate commerce in
connection with a public offering of its securities. See Investment Company Act of 1940
§ 7(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7(d). Private offerings may be made under the limitations of
§ 3(c)(1). See supra text accompanying notes 52-62.
139 See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
140 I.R.C. § 957.
141 Id.
142 See id. § 951; see also LEMKE ET AL., supra note 31, § 8:21 (explaining that the conse-
quences could include "acceleration of certain taxable income and conversion of certain
capital gains into ordinary income").
143 LEMKE ET AL., supra note 31, § 8:21.
144 I.R.C. § 1297 ("[T]he term 'passive foreign investment company' means any for-
eign corporation if ... 75[%] or more of the gross income of such corporation for the
taxable year is passive income, or ... the average percentage of assets (as determined in
accordance with subsection(e)) held by such corporation during the taxable year which




est tax charge. 45 Generally, this high tax would offset most of the
benefits that the U.S. investor would otherwise have.' 46 However, a
loophole exists to avoid some of this unfavorable tax treatment.
47
B. U.S. Department of Labor, ERISA, and Pension Fund
Investment Offshore
With an increasing number of pension plans, endowments, and
charities investing in hedge funds, the activities of hedge funds play a
larger role in the lives of small, individual investors.1 48 Pension plans
have a fiduciary relationship to their beneficiaries, so when pension
plans invest in hedge funds, these plan fiduciaries arguably expose
their beneficiaries to greater risks with their retirement income.
1 49
Potential losses stemming from risky hedge fund investments question
the pension plan's ability to satisfy its requirements as a fiduciary to
the beneficiaries of the plan.
1 50
ERISA, the legislation with the greatest impact on pension plans,
together with its regulations, limits the entities that are qualified to
hold "plan assets" in offshore funds. 15 1 ERISA places limitations on
plan fiduciaries,1 52 establishes a standard of conduct, 53 makes guide-
lines for complying with the "prudent conduct" standard, 154 prohibits
certain transactions,1 55 creates a bonding requirement, 56 and ex-
plains the proper custody of plan assets.' 57 The custody of assets pro-
145 See id. § 1291.
146 See LEMKE ET hA.., supra note 31, § 8:22.
147 See I.R.C. §§ 1293, 1295 (qualified electing fund provisions).
148 See O'Hara, supra note 121, at 5; see also Riva D. Atlas & Mary Williams Walsh, Pen-
sion Officers Putting Billions into Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2005, at 1 ("Faced with
growing numbers of retirees, pension plans are pouring billions into hedge funds, the
secretive and lightly regulated investment partnerships that once managed money only for
wealthy investors.").
149 See Roye Speech, supra note 2.
150 See id.
151 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 404(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(b) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404b-1 (2006).
152 Section 404(a)(1) of ERISA sets forth the basic responsibilities and expectations of
an ERISA plan fiduciary. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (A) ("exclusive benefit" rule); id.
§ 1104(a) (1) (B) ("prudence" rule); id. § 1104(a) (1) (C) ("diversification" rule "so as to
minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to
do so"); id. § 1104(a) (1) (D) (requiring action by fiduciaries in accordance with plan docu-
ments and the other provisions of ERISA).
153 See supra note 152.
154 See 29 U.S.C. § 11 04(a) (1) (B).
155 See id. § 1106. There are some exemptions to the prohibited transactions. See id.
§ 1108.
156 See id. § 1112.
157 See id. § 1104(b)-(c).
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vision specifically states that ERISA assets cannot be held outside the
jurisdiction of U.S. district courts unless certain conditions are met.158
Hedge funds that specifically and intentionally target investment
by pension plans are structured in such a way as not to be subject to
ERISA and its regulations 159 because of the fiduciary responsibilities
placed on ERISA plan fiduciaries. For example, a hedge fund adviser
can be deemed an ERISA plan fiduciary if the adviser takes compensa-
tion for his or her investments, renders advice about the ERISA plan
assets, and either has control over some plan assets or renders advice
pursuant to an agreement.160 One important inquiry is to determine
whether hedge fund assets are plan assets: If 25% or more of the
hedge fund's assets are plan assets, the hedge fund adviser is deemed
an ERISA plan fiduciary.16'
Some funds face a tradeoff between accepting regulation under
ERISA and attracting investors to their hedge fund. 162 On the one
hand, accepting ERISA plan funds entails the expense of the fiduciary
duty. 163 On the other hand, because pension funds can bring in large
amounts of assets,1 64 some fund advisers are willing to accept the fidu-
ciary duty that comes with managing ERISA funds. 165 Typically,
before a pension plan invests in a hedge fund, the ERISA fiduciary
"will require assurances from the hedge fund adviser that it will not be
liable under ERISA for any misconduct on the part of the hedge fund
adviser in managing the plan assets."1 66 Hedge fund advisers can ordi-
narily protect ERISA plan fiduciaries from liability for such miscon-
duct if the hedge fund adviser registers with the SEC as an investment
adviser. 167
158 See id. § 1104(b); Maintenance of the Indicia of Ownership of Plan Assets Outside
the Jurisdiction of the District Courts of the United States, 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404b-1 (2006).
159 See LEMKE ET AL., supra note 31, § 4:52.
160 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
161 See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101; see also Bronislaw E. Grala et al., Summary of ERISA Issues
for Hedge Fund Managers Considering Exceeding the 25 % Threshold on Benefit Plan Investors, in
PENSION PLAN INVESTMENTS 2005: CONFRONTING TODAY'S IssuEs 329, 329 (2005) ("Once
benefit plan investors cross the 25% threshold, the hedge fund manager will be subject to
fiduciary standards and prohibited transaction rules of ERISA."); Steve Zwick, 2006: Hedge
Funds Get Regulated, FUTURES, Dec. 1, 2005, at 60 ("[A] ny fund manager who gets more
than 25% of his money from pensions is subject to the same fiduciary responsibilities as
pension funds themselves under... ERISA... which is administered by neither the SEC
nor the CFT'C, but by the Department of Labor.").
162 See Div. oF INV. MGMT., supra note 7, at 28.
163 See supra text accompanying notes 151-158.
164 See Div. OF INV. MGMT., supra note 7, at 96-97.
165 See id. at 28.
166 Id.
167 Id.; see Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 405(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1105(d) (2000); id. § 1102(38).
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C. Commodity Futures Trading Commission and Pooled Assets
Offshore
Although the Commodity Exchange Act, 168 like all other federal
securities legislation, does not define the term hedge fund, the CFTC
has had some success in requiring the registration of hedge fund ad-
visers. 169 However, CFTC insiders recognize that the CFTC's regula-
tory methods concerning offshore investment are imperfect. 70 For
instance, if the hedge fund trades futures contracts or commodity op-
tions, the hedge fund adviser must register with the CFTC as a com-
modity pool operator1 7 ' or a commodity trading adviser 172 unless an
exemption is available. 17 3 Once the hedge fund adviser registers with
the CFTC, he or she becomes subject to the Commodity Exchange
Act's antifraud provisions1 74 and extensive disclosure requirements.
175
However, the Commodity Exchange Act still allows for loopholes
in the registration of offshore hedge fund advisers. 176 For example,
hedge funds regulated by other federal or state law-most offshore
hedge funds-can take advantage of Commodity Exchange Act Rule
4.5, which is intended to avoid double registration.1 7 7 Another ex-
emption exists for commodity pool operators that register with the
National Futures Association before beginning to operate the pool:
The operators may claim a specific exemption from all disclosures and
reporting requirements of registered commodity pool operators as
well as many recordkeeping requirements.
t 78
The Commodity Exchange Act rules include many exemptions
that offshore advisers can use. For instance, the CFTC rules exempt
offshore funds from registration when the adviser receives no com-
pensation 179 and when there are limited investments and investors in
168 Commodity Exchange Act §§ 1-27, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (2000).
169 See, e.g., HAMMER ET AL., supra note 4, § 2.9; Ernest E. Badway, Hedge Funds Under
Fire: Is There Body Armor Out There?, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., June 2005, at 33.
170 See To Consider the Reauthorization of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Hear-
ing Before the S. Comm. on Agric., Nutrition and Forestry, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (statement of
Sharon Brown-Hruska, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Commission) ("Congress
may wish to review whether the CFTC has clear and adequate authority to police retail
fraud, particularly in the foreign exchange area.").
171 See7 U.S.C. § la(5).
172 See id. § la(6).
173 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 4.5, 4.7(a) (2) (viii) (A), 4.14 (2006).
174 See 7 U.S.C. § 4b(a)(i).
175 See 17 C.F.R. pt. 4; see also DE BROUWER, supra note 23, at 15 ("The [Commodity
Exchange] Act requires funds to be registered, to report information about risks, historical
performance, fees, business background, and conflicts of interest to the ... CFTC... and
maintain records for possible inspection by the CFTC and . . .Department of Justice.").
176 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 4.13(a)(3)-(4) (exemptions from registration as a commodity
pool operator), 4.14(a) (8) (exemptions from registration as a commodity trading adviser).
'77 See id. § 4.5.
178 See id.; Div. OF INV. MGMT., supra note 7, at 25.
179 See 17 C.F.R. § 4.13(a).
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the pool.180 In addition, two recently adopted Commodity Exchange
Act rules allow hedge fund advisers to qualify for exemptions from
commodity pool operator and commodity trading adviser registra-
tion. 18 1 First, if a commodity pool operator operates a pool under a
registration statement, sells only to certain high net-worth investors,
and limits its commodity futures activities, then the operator may be
exempt. 182 Second, commodity pool operators that operate pools
that advertise and sell to only certain high net-worth investors may
also be exempt.1 83 Additionally, the Commodity Exchange Act and its
corresponding regulations contain a de minimis exemption that is simi-
lar to the SEC's de minimis exemption. 184 Generally, because of the
similarities between the Commodity Exchange Act exemptions and
the Investment Advisers Act exemptions, "hedge fund advisers that are
exempt from registration as an investment adviser also are usually ex-
empt from registration as a [commodity trading adviser]."185
IV
WHETHER AND HOW THE SEC SHOULD ALTER ITS HEDGE
FUND REGULATORY REGIME
A. The SEC's Inability to Regulate Hedge Funds Effectively
Notably, during the recent shift to increase the SEC's regulation
of hedge funds, there have been no moves to eliminate the investment
vehicle entirely. In fact, some commentators have noted a need for
hedge funds in the marketplace.1 86 With the average investor's inter-
est in hedge funds increasing, 187 market overseers have expressed a
desire to protect unsophisticated investors from potential fraud. 188
However, the SEC's efforts seem shortsighted and ignore the concerns
of government officials from other regulatory agencies as well as
180 See id.
181 See PRESmErrr'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 1, at C-3.
182 See 17 C.F.R. § 4.13(a) (3).
183 See id. § 4.13(a) (4).
184 See 7 U.S.C. § 6m(1) (2000) (providing exemption from registration for commodity
trading advisers with fifteen or fewer clients); 17 C.F.R. § 4.14(a) (10).
185 Div. OF INv. MGMT., supra note 7, at 25; see 17 C.F.R. §§ 4.14(a) (4)-(5).
186 See, e.g., Quarles Statement, supra note 3; Federal Reserve's First Monetary Policy Report
for 2004: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 37
(2004) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board), quoted in Fin.
Servs. Roundtable Comment, supra note 111, at 1-2 ("[Hedge funds] have been very help-
ful to liquidity and hence the international flexibility of our financial system."); Justin Fox,
Fear of a Black Box, FORTUNE, Nov. 14, 2005, at 174 ("[H]edge funds appear to deliver better
returns-and returns that don'tjust follow the ups and downs of the stock market-than
the heavily regulated, transparent, largely blowup-free mutual fund industry.").
187 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
188 See supra Part II.C.
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hedge fund and mutual fund insiders, investors, academics, and attor-
neys who specialize in the regulation of financial institutions.'8 9
For instance, the SEC staff did not consider whether the SEC has
the means to effectively enforce the registration regulation. 190 Like
many Americans, many SEC employees do not understand the work-
ings and investment strategies of hedge funds.191 Had the court in
189 See supra Part II.A.
190 See Comment, W. Nieves, on Proposed Rule: Registration Under the Advisers Act of
Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Adviser Act Release No. 2266, (Oct. 26, 2004),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/wnievesO2604.htm; PRESIDENT'S WORKING
GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 1, at 42 ("[D]irect regulation of hedge funds could pre-
sent formidable challenges in terms of cost and effectiveness."); see also Bair Comment,
supra note 105, at 4 ("I would hate to see that luster tarnished a few years from now by a
hedge fund scandal because a well-intentioned SEC prematurely decided to take responsi-
bility for an industry it did not have sufficient resources to oversee."); MFA Comment,
supra note 106, at 2 ("[T]he SEC has only 495 employees responsible for examining 8,000
mutual funds with about 91 million investors, managing $7 trillion. The SEC has not made
clear that the agency would have the needed expertise to monitor thousands more hedge
fund advisers."); Comment, Joseph H. Omansky, President, Sky Fund LLC, SkyRank Sys-
tem of Hedge Fund Ratings, on Proposed Rule: Registration Under the Advisers Act of
Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, SEC Release No. 2266 (Sept. 24, 2004), http://www.sec
.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/jhomanskyl880.htm ("The SEC alone cannot reduce fraud
through the registration of hedge funds . . . ."); Schulte Roth & Zabel Comment, supra
note 77, at 9 ("[T]he average tenure of the inspection staff currently is approximately 1.9
years.... The turnover rate among examiners, combined with length of the Commission's
inspection cycle, makes the likelihood of uncovering fraud even less likely."); Amend, supra
note 109, at 7 ("[SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins] doesn't think the SEC has enough man-
power to adequately police hedge funds."); Vineeta Anand, SEC Requests Industry Group Help
in Training, INVESTMENT NEWS, Oct. 24, 2005, at 32 ("The [SEC] has asked the hedge fund
industry to help train SEC staff to inspect the estimated 1,260 hedge fund investment advis-
ers expected to register by February [2006]."); Susan L. Barreto, SEC Not Prepared for the
Registration Hood?, HEDGEWORLD NEWS, Sept. 29, 2005 ("'How adequately [is the SEC] de-
fending investors if they too are overwhelmed?'" (quoting Brian Shapiro, president of Car-
bon360, a research and advisory firm that works with hedge fund managers));
Hendrickson, supra note 109, at 7 ("In a blistering September 29 speech before the Man-
aged Funds Association, [SEC Commissioner Paul] Atkins... said ... , '[W]e have neither
the resources nor the expertise to oversee all the potential new registrants .... The pre-
cious time and attention of our examination staff is being diverted to advisers that manage
the money of a relatively tiny number of sophisticated investors .... [Y]ou have to wonder
if the SEC is doing the right thing.'"); Don Noone, Letter to the Editor, No SEC Cops
Walking the Hedge Fund Beat, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2005, at A19 ("There are no cops on the
hedge fund beat; frauds are only coming to light because defrauded investors are talking
out and the media is listening.... The SEC's regulation of hedge funds is a square-pegged
solution praying it finds a square-holed problem."). Likewise, one could argue that money
that the SEC would have to divert to the hedge fund regulatory scheme could be better
spent elsewhere in its regulatory fiefdom. See Paredes, supra note 3, at 989.
191 Part of what makes hedge funds so profitable is their secret and unique investment
methods, so it is only logical that the average SEC employee would not understand them.
See, e.g., Anand, supra note 190, at 32 ("The SEC's office of compliance inspections and
examinations has called upon members of the Washington-based Managed Funds Associa-
tion, which represents the hedge fund industry, to speak at training sessions the SEC has
begun to hold for its staff in preparation for when [the] new rule kicks in . . . ."); Joe
Hutnyan, New Hedge Fund Rule Poses Unique Challenges for SEC, SEC. WE., Sept. 26, 2005, at 10
("The new system is going to be a huge learning curve for SEC staff." (quotations
omitted)).
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Goldstein not invalidated the registration regulations, the SEC would
have faced great costs in educating its staff to examine and process the
information gleaned from registration.1 92 Until the SEC has the re-
sources necessary to survey the hedge fund market and to enforce ac-
tions against violative hedge fund advisers, 193 fund registration will
strain the SEC's existing resources. Therefore, the registration re-
quirements would be less effective at preventing and detecting fraud,
two goals that the SEC stated explicitly when it enacted the registra-
tion requirement.1
94
In establishing the registration regulations, the SEC also did not
consider whether it has jurisdiction to create such a rule and to
change its regulatory regime by redefining "client."1 9 5 Even prior to
the Goldstein decision, some commentators argued that the SEC had
exceeded its powers by using a "look-through" provision 196 to define
client.197 The SEC's power to make rules is not an express grant for
the agency to remake law by redefining such an essential term, for
example. 9 8 Instead, the SEC has the power to carry out the will of
192 See, e.g., Comment, Nora M. Jordan et al., Davis Polk & Wardwell, on Proposed
Rule: Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 2266, File No. S7-30-04, at 3 (Sept. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Davis
Polk & Wardwell Comment], http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/nora091504
.pdf ("We believe that the Commission underestimates the costs and market effects of re-
gistration and incorrectly infers that registration imposes only minimal burdens on
advisers.").
193 See supra note 190.
194 See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
195 See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
196 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (3) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b) (3) (1)-(2) (2006); seeRegis-
tration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,067 (Dec. 10, 2004) ("[Rule 203(b) (3) (2)] re-
quires an advisor to 'look through' a hedge fund to determine whether it is eligible for the
private advisor exemption . . ").
197 See, e.g., MFA Comment, supra note 106, at 2; see also Comment, Marco V. Masotti,
Chair, Comm. on Private Inv. Funds, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, on Proposed
Rule: Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 2266, File No. S7-30-04, at 1-2 (Sept. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Ass'n
of the Bar of the City of New York Comment], http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s73004/mvmasotti091504.pdf ("[W]e are concerned with.., the statutory authority of the
Commission to count clients using the 'look-through' method as provided in the ...
Rule."). According to the Committee on Private Investment Funds of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, it is unclear how the look-through provision would affect
offshore advisers of offshore funds. SeeAss'n of the Bar of the City of New York Comment,
supra, at 5 ("The 'look-through' requirement in the... Rule becomes even more problem-
atic in the context of an offshore adviser to an offshore fund where the adviser would only
be required to count. U.S. investors. The . . .Rule is unclear on whether the same 'look-
through' requirement would apply."). A comment letter from the law firm Davis Polk &
Wardwell echoes the Association's concerns. See Davis Polk & Wardwell Comment, supra
note 192, at 3, 10 ("We suggest various technical clarifications to the ... Rule, including
clarifications of ... the extraterritorial reach of the ... Rule .... We are concerned that
this lack of guidance will create significant ambiguity in the ... Rule and its application.").
198 See MFA Comment, supra note 106, at 2.
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Congress, as expressed by statute, to adopt regulations to effect con-
gressional will. 199 Since Congress adopted the Investment Advisers
Act, it clearly did not account for a look-through provision by the SEC
for counting clients, as the Goldstein court observed.200 Thus, at the
very least, the SEC should have allowed for additional comments dur-
ing the official comment period and should have paid closer attention
to its own authority in promulgating a registration requirement.
By allowing the current ambiguities regarding offshore hedge
funds and offshore advisers to stand, the SEC has created additional
problems. An SEC official has even acknowledged that by early 2005,
70% of the hedge fund market consisted of offshore hedge funds.2
0'
Obviously, this is only an estimate because the SEC staff was unable to
develop reliable figures in making its recommendation. 20 2 However,
leaving the regulation as enacted continues to confuse advisers who
oversee perhaps billions of dollars offshore. Furthermore, if there are
so many funds domiciled offshore, the registration requirement is in-
herently inefficient because it allows loopholes for offshore advisers
who accept investment funds from U.S. investors.20 3
Determining where to draw the line on regulation is difficult. On
the one hand, the SEC should keep hedge fund investment largely
unregulated and allow investors to continue reaping the benefits of
the funds' risky investment strategies without forcing the average
American taxpayer to pay to protect wealthy, sophisticated investors
from their inherently risky investment decisions. 20 4 On the other
hand, now that more unsophisticated investors are aware of the great
199 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(a), 78w(a).
200 See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 878-79, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976), quoted in MFA Comment, supra note 106,
at 2.
201 See Matt Piotrowski, SEC Regulation Concerns Hedge Funds, OIL DAILY, Apr. 12, 2005.
202 See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Invest-
ment Advisers Act Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,055 (Dec. 10, 2004) ("It is
difficult to estimate precisely the size of the hedge fund industry .... ).
203 See Wright Comment, supra note 81, at 1-2 (asking for clarification of the proposed
rule as to offshore funds).
204 See, e.g., Comment, Max Rottersman, President, Fund Forensics, on Proposed Rule:
Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 2266, File No. S7-30-04 (Sept. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Fund Forensics Com-
ment], http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/mrottersman5801.htm ("Perhaps
cold-hearted, but modestly wealthy people who lose their money in un-regulated hedge
funds have only themselves to blame. If a hedge fund commits fraud the American tax-
payer should not foot the bill through the S.E.C."); Paredes, supra note 3, at 990 ("[T he
SEC has deferred to such well-heeled investors to protect themselves through market disci-
pline."); Robert C. Pozen, Hedge Funds Today: To Regulate or Not, WALL ST. J.,June 20, 2005,
at A14 ("Should the SEC establish regulatory safeguards to protect investors in hedge
funds that underperform? No. These investors are almost all wealthy individuals and insti-
tutions who should be able to protect themselves... absent fraud for which they already
have legal claims . .. ").
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opportunities offered by hedge funds, these investors will likely seek
to invest without truly knowing the associated risks.205 The question
comes down to how the SEC or Congress should strike a balance be-
tween these two scenarios.
While requiring hedge fund advisers to register with the SEC and
to undergo periodic SEC examinations would seem to benefit inves-
tors, 20 6 registration comes with enormous costs. 20 7 Currently, many
unregistered hedge funds do not have the infrastructure necessary to
meet the SEC's disclosure requirements. 208 When it hastily required
hedge fund advisers to register with the SEC by February 1, 2006, the
SEC forced some hedge funds to develop ad hoc reporting mecha-
nisms that will likely need future correction. 20 9 For funds without
strong existing compliance or reporting mechanisms, the need to
quickly establish such programs will come at a high cost to the hedge
fund's investors.210 This high cost could mean the end of small hedge
funds. Furthermore, once hedge funds have their reporting mecha-
nisms in place, U.S. taxpayers-many of whom do not meet the mini-
mum requirements to invest in a hedge fund-will pay an enormous
amount of money to cover the additional SEC employees necessary to
process all of the disclosures and periodic filings.
205 Unsophisticated investors have been able to gain access to hedge funds through
funds of hedge funds, see Leslie Rahl & Stephen Rahl, Institutionalization of Hedge Funds:
How Can Hedge Funds Be Tamed Without Breaking Their Spirit or Negatively Impairing Their
Performance?, in HEDGE FUND STRATEGIES: A GLOBAL OUTLOOK 69, 69-70 (Brian R. Bruce
ed., 2002), as well as the new publicly traded hedge funds, see Barbara Kiviat, Hello, Hedge
Funds, TIME, Dec. 4, 2006, at 62, and Merrill Lynch's and Goldman Sachs's new index-
based products that offer hedge fund exposure, see Hedge Funds: Attack of the Clones, Bus.
WK. ONLINE, Dec. 4, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/dec2006/pi20
061204_627321 .htm?campaign-id=RssjtopStories.
206 See Div. OF INV. MGMT., supra note 7, at xi.
207 See, e.g., Schulte Roth & Zabel Comment, supra note 77, at 11 ("We are concerned
that the Commission underestimates the full extent of these costs."); DE BROUWER, supra
note 23, at 212 ("The cost to regulators-and ultimately the tax-payer--could include an
increase in staff at domestic and international institutions to process, analy[z]e and dissem-
inate the information, and costs of publication of the results."); Emmett Ryan, A Roadmap
to SEC Registration for Hedge Fund Invest Advisers, in IT'S THE RULE: THE NEW SEC ADVISER
REGULATION FOR HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 78, at 107, 111 ("While the SEC registration
process is not difficult, keeping up with compliance regulations is a Herculean ... task for
many investment advisers to hedge funds.").
208 See, e.g., Faille, supra note 90, at 30-31 (discussing how the regulations create a
"huge hurdle" to smaller hedge funds).
209 See, e.g., Netage Solutions, The Risks of Selecting an Investor Relations and Compliance
Management System, in IT'S THE RULE, THE NEW SEC ADVISER REGULATION FOR HEDGE FUNDS,
supra note 78, at 101, 101 ("Choosing an investor relations and compliance management
system is not ... easy, because a host of risks often get unnoticed. Either out of lack of
experience or because of the pressure to choose a solution quickly, hedge funds can end
up with a ticking time bomb if they do not anticipate the ... risks.").
210 See, e.g., Davis Polk & Wardwell Comment, supra note 192, at 12 ("Our view is that
such costs are substantial and increasing and will in some form be passed on to, and affect
returns realized by, hedge fund investors.").
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B. Possible Fixes for the SEC Registration Regulation
In fixing the registration requirement, the SEC must consider
certain limitations it faces as a federal agency. As this Note has stated,
the majority of SEC employees do not specialize in hedge funds.21' In
addition, hedge fund enforcement would overstretch the SEC's lim-
ited resources.21 2 Therefore, it is important that the SEC fix the regis-
tration requirement in a way that the agency can easily implement
without a substantial financial commitment. Arguably, this discussion
is moot, because hedge funds cannot advertise and thus average inves-
tors who meet the statutory requirements would likely not learn of
hedge fund investment opportunities. However, this argument does
not hold weight in the age of the Internet, when any investor with
Internet access can find information on hedge funds on Morningstar
and Moody's.213 While registration does increase the necessary invest-
ment level and investor net-worth levels, it does so only slightly.
21 4
The SEC should thus reevaluate how it defines "accredited," "sophisti-
cated," and "qualified" such that the annual income and net-worth
figures would increase with inflation, for example, rather than rely on
static, outdated figures.2
1 5
1. Redefine "Accredited Investor" and "Qualified Purchaser"
To improve the registration requirement, the SEC could look to
the ideas and history behind hedge fund investment. Hedge fund ad-
visers intended to attract wealthy, sophisticated investors who could
absorb the losses from a poor investment.216 The SEC should create
new standards for "accredited investor" and "qualified purchaser"2
17
211 See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
212 See supra note 190-192 and accompanying text.
213 See, e.g., supra note 20.
214 See, e.g., Div. OF INV. MGMT., supra note 7, at xii ("[R]egistration of hedge fund
advisers under the Advisers Act would effectively increase the minimum investment re-
quirement for direct investments in certain hedge funds because registered advisers are
generally prohibited from charging performance fees unless investors have $750,000 in-
vested with the adviser or have a net worth of $1.5 million.").
215 See, e.g., Fund Forensics Comment, supra note 204 ("[T] he minimums need to keep
up with market valuations. The acid test.., should be, what amount of money would a
citizen need to hire a team of lawyers and accountants to monitor and defend their inter-
ests in the hedge fund? Or, put another way, what level of wealth is insufficient to protect
an investor from an unscrupulous hedge fund?").
216 See Paredes, supra note 3, at 980-84 (discussing the high-risk nature of hedge
funds).
217 See, e.g., Cox Statement, supra note 26 ("I am concerned that the current definition,
which is decades old, is not only out of date, but wholly inadequate to protect unsophistica-
ted investors from the complex risks of investment in most hedge funds."); MFA Comment,
supra note 106, at 3 ("Accredited investor standards... should be raised so that the mone-
tary thresholds reflect the inflation in wealth and incomes since 1982 or by imposing a
similar enhanced accredited investor standard under the Advisers Act for hedge fund in-
vestors."). Until the SEC adopts higher standards for individual investors, many industry
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because the Commission has not updated the specified wealth
amounts since 1982. At that time, a much smaller percentage of the
American public had the wealth necessary to be deemed an accred-
ited investor or a qualified purchaser. 218 As the number of million-
aires who will meet the SEC's statutory requirements for hedge fund
investment despite having little education in hedge fund investment
or general investment increases,21 9 the likelihood of fraud on the mar-
ket increases as well, which could in turn discourage investment in the
securities markets. 2
20
Currently, the SEC is accepting comments on a proposed rule to
redefine "accredited investor."221 The new definition would, among
other things, raise the minimum asset level of accredited investors,
whom the new rule labels "accredited natural persons."2 22 An accred-
ited natural person would still need a net worth of at least $1 million
but would also have to possess $2.5 million in "investments," which
will be adjusted every five years for inflation. 223 From the comments
received thus far, it appears that the accredited natural person stan-
dard could follow the path of the Goldstein litigation, as several com-
mentators have already referred to the new minimum investment level
of accredited natural persons as "arbitrary."
22 4
2. Encourage Voluntary Disclosure
One way to ease into a new regulatory regime might be to en-
courage voluntary disclosure. Indeed, one of the SEC's general goals
is to improve the dissemination of information to investors through
insiders believe that hedge fund investing is best kept out of the hands of unsophisticated
investors. See, e.g., Rattner, supra note 1. Since the D.C. Circuit invalidated the registration
requirement regulation in Goldstein, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox has suggested that he
would like to increase the net-worth level requirements for individuals who seek to invest
in hedge funds. See Orol, supra note 2.
218 See, e.g., Daniel P. Collins, SEC's 'Solution in Search of a Problem'?, FuTuRES, Dec. 2003,
at 60.
219 See, e.g., Britney Hit by Hedge Fund Scandal, supra note 122.
220 Cf Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys. Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("[I]t is
hard to imagine that there ever is a buyer or seller who does not rely on market integrity.
Who would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?").
221 See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accred-
ited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, Securities Act Release No. 8766, In-
vestment Advisers Act Release No. 2576, 72 Fed. Reg. 400 (proposed Jan. 4, 2007). The
proposed redefinition is in conjunction with a revised antifraud standard. See id.
222 Id. at 400 n.6, 405-07.
223 Id. at 414 (proposing to amend 17 C.F.R. § 230.215 and add 17 C.F.R. § 230.216).
224 E.g., Comment, M. Kelley Price, Vice President, Price Meadows Inc., on Proposed
Rule: Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited
Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, Securities Act Release No. 8766, Invest-




disclosures.2 25 By not instituting a system of voluntary disclosure
before promulgating the mandatory registration requirement, the
SEC has ignored a potential solution to the information-asymmetry
problem with hedge funds. While hedge funds are eager to get new,
wealthy investors, many investors are reluctant to make the minimum
investment and pay the exorbitant management fees without knowing
more about the funds. By voluntarily disclosing information, funds
could reap tremendous benefits from investors whom the voluntary
disclosures wooed. Furthermore, the SEC staff itself has suggested the
need for disclosure to hedge fund investors. 2 26 By starting with a vol-
untary disclosure system, those funds that are ready to make disclo-
sures to investors may profit because of their openness. This profit
could encourage nonreporting funds to implement reporting systems.
3. Educate Investors
Underlying the desire for disclosure is a related need for investor
education. U.S. investors are largely uneducated in the investment
techniques of hedge funds and generally do not fully understand the
risks associated with such investments. 22 7 Furthermore, the statutory
language does not provide a definition of "hedge fund."228 While in-
vestor education would come at a great cost to both the SEC and
hedge funds, having knowledgeable investors would presumably help
the SEC meet its goal of deterring fraud. Mandatory disclosures will
do little to deter fraud unless it is paired with investor education, be-
cause investors would not know how to treat the disclosed informa-
tion. Further, investor education would help those statutorily deemed
"sophisticated investors" to make better investment decisions within
the hedge fund world.
225 Interestingly, a recent study has shown that hedge funds that registered in anticipa-
tion of the February 2006 deadline historically had better past performance, more assets,
and higher quality than those funds that did not register. See Stephen Brown et al., Optimal
Disclosure and Operational Risk: Evidence from Hedge Fund Registration 33-34 (Yale Sch. of
Mgmt., Int'l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 06-15, 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=918461. The study ultimately concluded that economically, regis-
tration achieved some of its goals, see id. at 33, because there was "evidence that the infor-
mation in the form has the potential to add value to the investor decision-making process,"
id. at 4.
226 See Div. or INv. MGMT., supra note 7, at xi ("The [SEC] staff further recommends
that the [SEC] consider amending its rules to require that registered hedge fund advisers
file with the [SEC], and deliver to investors, a disclosure statement specifically designed for
hedge fund investors.").
227 See supra text accompanying note 1.
228 See supra text accompanying note 3.
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4. Rely on Existing Regulatory Mechanisms
Arguably, the current enforcement mechanism is sufficient and
no further regulation of hedge funds is necessary. For instance, in
enacting the registration regulation, the SEC sought to prevent and
deter fraud. However, further regulation is not the answer; looking at
the recent hedge fund scandals, each hedge fund adviser had broken
the law. 229 If existing criminal statutes can protect investors from the
behavior that the SEC is trying to prevent, there is no need to change
the regulatory regime and to create more rules that will be not only
expensive for the funds to implement-a cost likely passed down to
investors-but also difficult for the SEC to enforce given its already
stretched resources.
Further, expanding the regulatory regime may discourage inno-
vation and competition in U.S. markets.230 When the Department of
Treasury asks the SEC to loosen its restrictive reign, this is a sign that
the SEC has gone too far. Granted, investors have called for stricter
regulations on investment companies since scandals such as mutual
fund market timing, Enron, and Amaranth rocked newspaper head-
lines. On the other hand, investors would likewise call for the SEC to
loosen the regulatory regime if draconian regulations resulted in a
lack of innovation and prevented the investors from turning a profit.
While the SEC's current model of hedge fund regulation is clearly
imperfect, the other regulatory agencies have had enough success in
achieving the SEC's goals. Thus, the SEC should not try to make any
dramatic changes to the current regulatory regime.
CONCLUSION
Rather than institute onerous registration requirements that
leave open loopholes for potentially 70% of the hedge fund mar-
ket,23' the SEC should rethink its definitions of "accredited" and
229 See, e.g., Ben Heath &Julie Fishman-Lapin, Funds Face Further Regulation, ADVOCATE
(Ct.), Oct. 27, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 18650451 ("I am no apologist for fraud... but
we have a lot of statutes that restrict fraud on federal and state levels." (quoting Paul Roth,
founding partner of Manhattan-based Schulte Roth & Zabel, a law firm representing about
1,500 hedge, private equity, and offshore funds)).
230 See, e.g., Are Securities Rules Hurting U.S. Markets?, D ALBoOK, Nov. 30, 2006, http://
dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2006/11/30/panel-to-urge-rewriting-sec-rules-to-aid-compa-
nies ("An independent committee formed with the endorsement of Treasury Secretary
Henry M. Paulson Jr. called for a sweeping overhaul of securities regulations, citing con-
cerns that American markets are losing their competitiveness.").
231 See, e.g., Anand, supra note 190, at 32 ("Hedge fund advisers may circumvent the
registration requirements if they agree to lock up investors' money for at least two years.");
Hamilton, supra note 93 ("[S]ome fund managers are going out of their way to avoid the
agency. Funds must be registered if they allow investors to redeem their holdings within
two years. Therefore, many funds' lock-ups have been extended to two years instead of
one . . . . 'This is not heavy-handed regulation.'"); Hendrickson, supra note 109, at 7
[Vol. 92:795
OFFSHORE HEDGE FUNDS
"qualified," should encourage voluntary disclosure from hedge fund
advisers, and should develop educational programs for potential in-
vestors. The recently invalidated registration requirement overlooked
offshore hedge funds and their advisers, leaving a loophole for the
vast majority of U.S. assets currently invested in hedge funds. While
the IRS and CFJTC provide loopholes similar to those in the registra-
tion requirement, perhaps the SEC should consider the costs and ben-
efits of enacting provisions such as the ones in ERISA, which would
imply a fiduciary duty for hedge fund advisers. Even though this pro-
posal would help the SEC rein in offshore hedge fund advisers, it is
not a necessary fix. State authorities would be the appropriate bodies
to create such duties, and hedge funds are already subject to antifraud
provisions that the fiduciary duty would imply.
In the end, commentators may be correct that the average U.S.
investor should stick to stocks, bonds, and mutual funds. But as long
as there is hype around hedge funds, there is a need, at the very least,
to educate investors.
(noting that SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins believes that "rules requiring hedge funds to
register with the SEC . ..hav[e] little effect on finding fraudsters, but stretch[ ] the
agency's examination staff perilously thin"); David Hoffman, One on One with Ron Baron of
Baron Capital Group Inc., INVESTMENT NEWS, Dec. 19, 2005, at 69 ("I think lawyers for private
institutions are highly paid and will, in most instances, be able to navigate the rules that the
government puts forth. If people don't want to be regulated, they won't be."); Chidem
Kurdas, Use of Registration Loophole Seen as Risky, HEDGEWORLD NEws, Nov. 17, 2005 ("[T]he
assets already managed don't have to be locked up; only new money is subject to the lock-
up provision. So what if the manager does not take any new money? By the logic of the
rule as written, there has been an inference that such managers would also be exempt.");
Janet Lewis, New Twists Emerge in Registration Saga, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIGEST, Nov. 21,
2005, at 9 ("[H]edge fund advisers looking to avoid registration with the [SEC] by ex-
tending their funds' lockup periods will be able to do so regardless of the wishes of their
investors, according to lawyers and consultants in the field."); Nocera, supra note 27 ("The
new rule ... includes a ridiculously big loophole, exempting any hedge fund that locks up
investors' money for two years or more."); Zuckerman, supra note 27 ("Some big-name
hedge funds have imposed restrictions on when investors can withdraw money, among
other steps, which permits them to opt out of registering."); Gregory Zuckerman & Ian
McDonald, Hedge Funds Avoid SEC Registration Rule-Some Big Firms Change Lockups, Stop
Accepting New Investments to Take Advantage of Loopholes, WALL ST.J., Nov. 10, 2005, at C1 ("A
large number of major hedge-fund firms won't be registering with the [SEC] despite new
rules aimed at forcing most hedge-fund advisers to sign up by early next year.").
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